Matthew Louis Reese v. State
05-14-00838-CR
| Tex. App. | Jun 18, 2015Background
- Appellant Matthew Louis Reese pleaded guilty in three separate causes: aggravated sexual assault of a child with a deadly weapon (55-year sentence), sexual assault of a child (20-year sentence), and aggravated assault causing serious bodily injury (20-year sentence).
- The trial court ordered the sentences stacked: the 20-year sexual-assault sentence to begin only after the 55-year sentence ceased, and the other 20-year sentence to begin after the sexual-assault sentence ceased. Fines were also assessed in each cause.
- Reese challenged (1) the court’s jurisdiction because transfer orders were not in the record, and (2) the legality of stacking (ordering consecutive/cumulative sentences).
- The court treated the absence of transfer orders as a procedural record defect, not a jurisdictional defect, and noted a timely plea to the jurisdiction is required to preserve the complaint.
- The court analyzed cumulative sentencing authority under Penal Code § 3.03(b)(2)(A) for child sexual-abuse offenses and whether the offenses were prosecuted in a single criminal action for purposes of § 3.03(a).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trial court lacked jurisdiction because transfer orders are missing | Reese: absence of transfer orders renders transferee court actions void | State: missing transfer order is procedural; must be raised by timely plea or is waived | Waived — Reese did not file timely plea; absence of transfer order is procedural, not jurisdictional |
| Sentences for child-sex offenses should not be stacked | Reese: sentences should run concurrently under general rule for same criminal episode | State: § 3.03(b)(2)(A) permits consecutive sentences for listed child-sex offenses | Affirmed — § 3.03(b)(2)(A) authorizes cumulation for convictions under § 22.021, so stacking those sentences was proper |
| Whether aggravated-assault sentence (§ 22.02) can be stacked with child-sex sentences | Reese: argues convictions were prosecuted in a single criminal action, so § 3.03 governs and does not list § 22.02 for stacking | State: plea proceedings were separate days; § 3.03(a) applies only when prosecuted in single action; otherwise Art. 42.08 permits stacking | Affirmed — convictions were not prosecuted in a single criminal action; trial court had discretion under art. 42.08 to order cumulative sentences |
| Abuse of discretion in ordering cumulative sentences | Reese: trial court abused discretion by stacking all sentences | State: statutory provisions and separate plea proceedings gave court discretion to cumulate | No abuse — statutory exceptions and separate prosecutions supported the court’s exercise of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Lemasurier v. State, 91 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002) (absence of transfer order is procedural, not jurisdictional)
- Mills v. State, 742 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987) (failure to timely object waives claim about missing transfer order)
- Nicholas v. State, 56 S.W.3d 760 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001) (trial court has discretion to stack sentences when law authorizes cumulation)
- Hurley v. State, 130 S.W.3d 501 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004) (same: trial court discretion to impose consecutive sentences when permitted)
- Bonilla v. State, 452 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (general rule that offenses from same criminal episode run concurrently)
- Robbins v. State, 914 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (separate plea proceedings indicate separate prosecutions for § 3.03 analysis)