Matter of J.S., 2017 MT 214

Background

Respondent J.S., diagnosed with bipolar disorder, was subject to two emergency detentions in early Feb 2016 after psychotic behavior and a severe, infected leg wound that she could not reliably care for.
The State filed a petition for involuntary commitment; at trial the chief State evaluator (Waples) testified J.S. was manic, delusional, denied illness, and would not reliably seek or accept treatment, supporting commitment to Montana State Hospital (MSH) as least restrictive.
J.S.’s counsel attended the evaluation, obtained an independent exam by Dr. Smelko (who did not testify), cross‑examined Waples, and argued dismissal and that the State failed to meet its burden and least‑restrictive placement requirement.
The District Court found the State met the clear and convincing standard and committed J.S. to MSH because community placements were inappropriate given her denial of illness and danger of untreated wound.
On appeal J.S. raised only an ineffective‑assistance‑of‑counsel claim, challenging counsel’s investigation of community alternatives, failure to seek continuance, hearsay objections, and exclusion/compulsion issues during the evaluator’s interview.
The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the commitment, reconsidered the standard for ineffectiveness claims in civil commitment proceedings, and held Strickland applies (overruling parts of prior K.G.F. rule).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standard for reviewing ineffective‑assistance claims in civil commitment cases	K.G.F. required a formal list of “critical areas” and stricter rules than Strickland	Strickland governs; K.G.F. went too far in formalism	Court adopts Strickland standard (defers to reasonableness under professional norms) and narrows K.G.F.
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or secure community placement options	Counsel failed to explore or request continuance to pursue community alternatives	Counsel argued dismissal, consulted expert (Smelko), and community placement was futile because J.S. denied illness and refused meds	Counsel not deficient; no reasonable alternatives available; no prejudice shown
Whether counsel’s handling of hearsay and evidentiary objections was deficient	Failure to immediately object to evaluator’s background testimony and hearsay led court to rely on it	Counsel used same facts to argue dismissal; objections were made and the court considered report as basis for opinion	Not deficient—objections were raised and counsel used facts strategically; bench ruling did not show counsel failure
Whether J.S. was deprived of right to remain silent or to testify during evaluation and whether counsel failed to protect those rights	Counsel prevented testimony / failed to assert silence protections leading to adverse use of non‑responses	The record shows J.S. was not denied right to testify; statutory right to remain silent does not bar use of non‑responses in civil commitment	No counsel deficiency; statutory silence right here does not invoke Fifth Amendment protections; admission of non‑responses was not reversible error

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice; reasonableness under professional norms)
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (civil commitment standard of proof requires clear and convincing evidence)
In re K.G.F., 306 Mont. 1 (Mont. 2001) (Montana case recognizing right to effective counsel in commitment proceedings; partially overruled here as to rigid standards)
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (liberty interests implicated in civil commitment)
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980) (compelled confinement and liberty interests)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard of proof principles and due process)