158 F. Supp. 3d 317
E.D. Pa.2016Background
- Paul Mathis, an atheist, worked as an installation mechanic for Christian Heating & Air Conditioning (Christian HVAC) from 2010 to Jan. 2012; the company requires employees to wear an ID badge that displays a religious mission statement on the back invoking “the Lord.”
- Mathis covered the mission-statement side of his badge with tape because he disagreed with the religious message; management did not notice until his last day.
- Owner David Peppelman (a born‑again Christian) confronted Mathis, told him to wear the badge uncovered or be "done," took the badge, and Mathis’s employment ended that day; contemporaneous witnesses dispute whether Mathis quit or was fired.
- Mathis sued under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act alleging failure to accommodate his religious beliefs (atheism) and retaliatory termination for opposing a religious practice at work.
- Defendant asserted, among other defenses, that RFRA barred enforcement of Title VII against it; plaintiff moved to strike that affirmative defense. The court considered cross‑motions for summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether RFRA is available as a defense in a private suit | RFRA protects only against government action; not available in private disputes | RFRA applies because statutes like Title VII can be enforced by the government (EEOC), so RFRA defense should be allowed | RFRA defense struck — RFRA applies only when the government is a party; court grants plaintiff partial SJ on that defense |
| Whether Mathis stated a prima facie failure‑to‑accommodate claim under Title VII/PHRA | Mathis sincerely holds atheistic beliefs that conflict with the badge requirement; he informed employer and was disciplined/terminated | Employer says Mathis did not notify management of a religious conflict and thus cannot meet elements | Genuine disputes of material fact exist on notice/conflict; sincerity admitted; claim survives summary judgment |
| Whether employer showed undue hardship to justify denying accommodation | Mathis sought only to keep tape over his own badge — de minimis burden | Employer contends accommodating would burden its religious expression and business | Court finds no evidence of more‑than‑de minimis hardship; undue‑hardship is a fact issue for jury; summary judgment denied for employer |
| Whether termination/constructive discharge supports retaliation claim | Mathis opposed the practice (protected activity); was fired/constructively discharged in close temporal proximity | Employer contends Mathis voluntarily quit after being given an option to comply | Court finds sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude termination/constructive discharge and causation; retaliation claim survives summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Listecki v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 780 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2015) (RFRA applies only when government is a party)
- Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh‑Day Adventists v. McGill, 617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010) (same interpretation of RFRA)
- Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999) (RFRA limited to government action)
- Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 2006) (contrary view permitting RFRA defense in private suit under certain circumstances)
- Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (questions applicability of RFRA to private disputes)
- Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 768 (U.S. 2015) (employer motive, not employee notice, controls in certain accommodation/discrimination contexts)
- GEO Group, Inc. v. EEOC, 616 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (elements for failure‑to‑accommodate claim)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (broad definition of adverse action in retaliation context)