346 F. Supp. 3d 723
M.D. Penn.2018Background
- CSL operates a public-facing plasma donation center in York, PA that screens, accepts/rejects, collects plasma, and sells it to pharmaceutical manufacturers; it is subject to FDA regulation.
- Plaintiff Matheis has PTSD, uses a service dog (Odin), had donated ~90 times at the CSL center without incident before October 2016.
- CSL has a policy disallowing service animals for anxiety-related conditions, viewing service-dog use for anxiety as indicating anxiety severe enough to risk donor safety during phlebotomy; CSL may defer donors and can require physician input.
- Plaintiff was told dogs were not allowed, informed staff Odin was a service dog, was deferred unless he produced a physician’s note; he began to panic and left; he did not provide a note or return.
- Plaintiff sued under Title III of the ADA (and asserted, but abandoned, an emotional-distress claim). CSL moved for summary judgment.
- The court held (1) a plasma donation center is a “public accommodation” under Title III, but (2) CSL had a legitimate, non-discriminatory, safety-based reason to temporarily defer Plaintiff, so summary judgment for CSL was granted.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a plasma donation center is a "public accommodation" under Title III of the ADA | Plasma centers are similar to enumerated "service establishments" and fall within "other service establishment"; ADA should be liberally construed | Plasma centers are manufacturers or distinct from service establishments because they process biological product and pay donors rather than charging customers | Court held plasma donation centers qualify as public accommodations under Section 12181(7)(F) (adopting Levorsen reasoning) |
| Whether CSL unlawfully discriminated by denying access for Plaintiff's disability (PTSD/service dog) | Denial was disability-based and therefore discriminatory under Title III | Denial was based on legitimate safety/medical concerns under FDA rules, not animus; offered physician-note alternative | Court held Plaintiff made a prima facie Title III claim but CSL articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for temporary deferral; no ADA liability at summary judgment |
| Whether ADA obligations conflict with FDA regulatory duties and whether safety rules permit exclusion | ADA should apply; safety concerns can be accommodated without categorical exclusion | FDA regulations require strict donor screening; safety rules permit rejecting donors whose condition could make donation unsafe | Court: ADA applies but DOJ/ADA allow legitimate safety requirements; FDA duties justify medically based, non-discriminatory deferral |
| Whether Plaintiff was permanently ineligible or could cure the deferral | Plaintiff argued wrongful exclusion and sought access to donate | CSL offered that a physician's note showing safe donation would allow reconsideration; Plaintiff provided none | Court: CSL’s deferral was temporary/medical in nature; Plaintiff not per se ineligible but failed to demonstrate he could safely donate, so CSL entitled to summary judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma, Inc., 828 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2016) (plasma donation centers are public accommodations under Title III)
- PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (U.S. 2001) (ADA’s remedial provisions construed liberally to afford equal access)
- Berardelli v. Allied Servs. Inst. of Rehab. Med., 900 F.3d 104 (3d Cir. 2018) (Title III public-accommodation principles and direct-threat framework)
- Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (U.S. 1998) (HIV is a disability under the ADA; interaction of public-health rules and ADA)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment burdens and standards)