Mastin v. Ditech Financial, LLC
3:17-cv-00368
E.D. Va.Jan 23, 2018Background
- In 2005 the Mastins executed a note and deed of trust for a Spotsylvania, VA home; they defaulted beginning in 2009.
- Ditech (servicer) assumed servicing in 2013; Plaintiffs repeatedly sought loan-modification review, submitted applications and documents (including an Aug. 22, 2016 application and an Aug. 30, 2016 profit-and-loss).
- Ditech scheduled a foreclosure; Plaintiffs were told a corrected profit-and-loss would stop the sale, they resubmitted the correction, but a foreclosure sale occurred on Nov. 9, 2016 and the purchaser was Bank of New York Mellon.
- Plaintiffs sued under federal consumer-regulation provisions (Regulation Z/12 C.F.R. §1026.36 and Regulation X/12 C.F.R. §1024.38 and §1024.41), and sought rescission of the foreclosure sale.
- The court treated the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6): it dismissed some claims with prejudice (no viable legal theory) and dismissed one claim without prejudice (insufficient factual detail) while granting limited leave to amend.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ditech violated Reg. Z §1026.36(c)(1)(ii) by refusing partial payments/suspense account | Mastin: Ditech could have held partial payments in suspense and must have done so; refusal caused harm | Ditech: Regulation is permissive (may hold or return); Deed of Trust permits rejecting partial payments insufficient to bring loan current | Dismissed with prejudice — regulation is permissive and Deed of Trust allows rejecting partial payments; claim futile |
| Whether 12 C.F.R. §1024.38(a) (servicer policies) creates a private right of action | Mastin: §1024.38(a) creates enforceable duties and supports claim | Ditech: §1024.38 is a general servicing-policy rule enacted under CFPB authority that CFPB did not make privately enforceable | Dismissed with prejudice — §1024.38 does not create a private right of action; CFPB intended enforcement by regulators only |
| Whether Ditech violated §1024.41(g) by conducting foreclosure after receiving a complete loss-mitigation application >37 days before sale | Mastin: Submitted application (and later corrected doc) — Ditech should have postponed sale | Ditech: It reasonably deemed application incomplete; servicers have discretion to set required documents; plaintiffs failed to allege dates showing >37 days | Dismissed without prejudice as to §1024.41(g) — plaintiffs failed to plead the necessary dates; court grants leave to amend limited to this claim |
| Whether plaintiffs may obtain equitable rescission of the foreclosure sale as remedy for regulatory violations | Mastin: Rescission is appropriate to restore pre-sale position | Ditech: Relevant regulations either exclude mortgages (Reg Z rescission) or don’t create private claims/remedies; §1024.41 supplies statutory damages only; §1024.38 not privately enforceable | Denied — rescission not available under pleaded federal regulations; remedy limited to statutory damages under §1024.41; rescission theory fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364 (U.S. 1925) (plain meaning of statutory text preferred over strained constructions)
- Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (U.S. 2001) (agencies cannot create private rights of action by regulation)
- Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (U.S. 1979) (limitations on agency-created private rights)
- Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (U.S. 1979) (federal courts retain equitable injunctive power absent clear congressional command)
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (U.S. 1938) (federal courts apply state substantive law in diversity cases)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must be plausible, not speculative)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (legal conclusions not entitled to assumed truth at pleading stage)
- Labor v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2006) (leave to amend denied only for futility, bad faith, or prejudice)
- Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503 (4th Cir. 1986) (standard for denying leave to amend)
