Massey v. United States, 895 F.3d 248

Background

Burgess Massey was convicted in 2004 of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced under the ACCA after the district court found three prior New York convictions (3rd‑degree robbery, 2nd‑degree assault, attempted 2nd‑degree assault) were violent felonies.
This Court affirmed Massey’s conviction and sentence in 2006, relying on the ACCA force clause. Massey’s direct certiorari petition was denied.
Massey filed a § 2255 motion (and multiple successive motions). After Johnson II (invalidating the ACCA residual clause) he sought leave to file a successive § 2255 arguing his predicates no longer qualified.
The Second Circuit initially granted leave based on a now‑vacated decision in United States v. Jones (Jones I), but Jones I was later vacated and the law in this Circuit reverted to treating New York robbery as an ACCA predicate under the force clause.
The District Court found Massey’s successive § 2255 motion relied on Johnson II and denied relief on the merits (holding 3rd‑degree robbery still qualifies under the force clause); the Second Circuit affirmed on procedural grounds.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Massey)	Defendant's Argument (Gov't)	Held
Whether Massey’s successive § 2255 motion may rely on Johnson II to satisfy § 2255(h)(2)	Massey argued his claim depended on both Johnson I (force‑clause interpretation) and Johnson II (residual clause invalidation), so Johnson II supplies the new, retroactive constitutional rule permitting a successive motion	Gov't argued Massey was sentenced under the ACCA force clause, not the residual clause, so Johnson II (which invalidated only the residual clause) is not the basis for a successive § 2255	Held: Denied — record clearly shows Massey was sentenced under the force clause, so his claim does not rely on Johnson II and § 2255(h)(2) is not satisfied.
Whether the sentencing record left ambiguity about which ACCA clause the court relied on	Massey suggested shifting precedent (Jones I) and ambiguity justified reliance on Johnson II	Gov't pointed to explicit sentencing findings and appellate opinion citing the force clause	Held: The record unambiguously shows the district court relied on the force clause.
Whether Johnson I (statutory interpretation of “physical force”) qualifies as a new rule of constitutional law to permit a successive § 2255	Massey sought relief based on Johnson I’s interpretation of “physical force”	Gov't noted Johnson I is statutory interpretation, not a new constitutional rule	Held: Johnson I is not a new constitutional rule and cannot support a successive § 2255 under § 2255(h).
Whether the district court erred in denying the § 2255 motion on the merits about New York 3rd‑degree robbery	Massey argued post‑Johnson I that NY 3rd‑degree robbery may not qualify as a force‑clause predicate	Gov't argued Circuit precedent (as restored) treats NY robbery as a force‑clause predicate	Held: Court did not reach merits on appeal because of procedural defect; district court’s denial on merits stood (appeal affirmed to extent of denial).

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Massey, 461 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2006) (appeal affirming ACCA enhancement based on force clause)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (residual clause of ACCA is unconstitutionally vague)
Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010) (interpretation of "physical force" in ACCA force clause)
Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical approach to determining predicate offenses)
United States v. Jones, 878 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2017) (post‑Beckles decision reinstating that NY robbery is a crime of violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause)
Spencer v. United States, 955 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1992) (prior Circuit precedent treating NY attempted robbery as a crime of violence)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson II applied retroactively on collateral review)
Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (holding the Sentencing Guidelines’ residual clause not subject to vagueness challenge)