MASSEY v. MCGINLEY
2:16-cv-00345
| W.D. Pa. | Jul 5, 2019Background
- On November 21, 2007 Jayquon Massey shot at a passing burgundy SUV in a Pittsburgh neighborhood; an innocent bystander (Cheryl Wilds) was killed. Massey claimed he believed occupants had robbed/ threatened him the prior day and that an arm with a gun protruded from the SUV.
- Massey was tried (Oct. 2008), convicted of first-degree murder and related firearms offenses, and sentenced to life without parole (Dec. 2008).
- Pennsylvania appellate process: Superior Court affirmed (Feb. 24, 2011); Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance (Oct. 14, 2011). PCRA petition filed Sept. 12, 2012; denied by PCRA court (Oct. 10, 2014) and Superior Court (June 30, 2015); PAA denied (Nov. 16, 2015).
- Federal habeas petition filed March 24, 2016 (amended petition). District court held the petition untimely by six days under AEDPA’s 1-year rule but analyzed claims on the merits in the alternative.
- Core claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for requesting no jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter (imperfect self-defense) and (2) cumulative prejudice from multiple alleged trial counsel errors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Massey) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / Respondent) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| AEDPA statute of limitations / equitable tolling | Massey: counsel mailed federal petition before deadline; missing mail justifies equitable tolling | Respondent: no proof mailed; counsel’s delay in verifying filing shows lack of diligence; attorney/mail issues not extraordinary | Court: Petition untimely and equitable tolling denied (no sufficient evidence of timely mailing and counsel not diligent) |
| IAC — failure to request voluntary manslaughter (imperfect self-defense) instruction | Massey: counsel’s decision to forgo the instruction was unreasonable and deprived jury of imperfect self-defense option; prejudiced outcome | Respondent: counsel reasonably pursued an all-or-nothing complete self-defense strategy; even if instruction omitted, no reasonable probability of different verdict given evidence of aggression/failure to retreat | Court: Denied relief — state courts reasonably applied Strickland; either strategic basis for counsel or absence of prejudice (both state-court rationales warranted deference) |
| Cumulative error / procedural default | Massey: combined trial errors deprived him of a fair trial and would undermine confidence in verdict; urges Martinez to excuse default | Respondent: claim unexhausted and procedurally defaulted; on the merits errors do not produce reasonable probability of different outcome | Court: Claim procedurally defaulted; even on de novo review, no prejudice shown and cumulative-error claim fails |
| Certificate of appealability (COA) | Massey: (implicitly) issues are debatable | Respondent: no substantial showing of denial of constitutional right | Held: COA denied — reasonable jurists would not debate timeliness or merits rulings |
Key Cases Cited
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling where diligence and extraordinary circumstances are shown)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (§2254(d) standards: "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" framework)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance of counsel test: performance and prejudice)
- Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (standard for rebutting state-court factual findings and relevance to habeas review)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (deference to state-court Strickland determinations; high bar for unreasonable application)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (exhaustion and procedural default principles)
- O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (requirement to present federal claims through one full round of state appellate review)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (actual innocence gateway for defaulted claims)
- Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 2004) (attorney error generally not extraordinary for equitable tolling in non-capital cases)
- Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784 (3d Cir. 2013) (standards for diligence in equitable tolling analysis)