196 F. Supp. 3d 25
D.D.C.2016Background
- Douglas Massey, Second Vice President of AFGE Local 17 and a VA lawyer on full-time union "official time," publicly opposed AFGE National President J. David Cox’s re-election and distributed flyers at AFGE’s 2015 National Convention criticizing Cox’s expenditures.
- William A. Preston, Local 17 President and convention sergeant‑at‑arms and a Cox supporter, confronted Massey in the hotel lobby and warned he could remove Massey’s official time if Massey opposed Cox. Massey put an arm around Preston and said Preston could not bully him.
- Preston filed a police report accusing Massey of threatening/assaulting him; Massey was questioned by police but not arrested. The Sergeant‑at‑Arms Panel then barred Massey from parts of the Convention and limited his participation.
- After the Convention, Preston removed Massey from official time, restricted his duties and office access, told Massey’s VA supervisor he feared for his safety (leading to a temporary administrative leave), and filed a denied TRO against Massey.
- Massey filed internal complaints; a Local Committee found probable cause against Preston, but National President Cox dismissed that committee and appointed a National Committee. Massey sued Preston, Cox, and AFGE under Title I (the Bill of Rights for Union Members) of the LMRDA, alleging violations of §§ 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(2).
- Motions to dismiss: Preston moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust and for failure to state claims; AFGE and Cox moved to dismiss various counts (including for lack of standing as to Count VI). The court denied Preston’s motion, granted Cox’s motion in full, and granted AFGE’s motion in part (dismissed Counts III–V and VI as to AFGE; allowed Counts I–II to proceed against AFGE).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Massey was required to exhaust internal union remedies before suing | Massey contends exhaustion is not mandatory here and internal remedies either are unavailable or would not provide full relief | Preston argued §101(a)(4) requires exhaustion and Massey failed to do so | Court: Exhaustion discretionary; Preston failed to show internal procedures would provide full relief; exhaustion not required here — Preston's exhaustion defense rejected |
| Whether Massey plausibly alleged Title I violations against Preston (false report, expulsion, removal from office, supervisor statements, TRO) | Massey alleges retaliatory false police report, expulsion from Convention, removal from official time and duties, defamatory statements causing administrative leave, and frivolous TRO — all chilling protected union speech/voting | Preston argued allegations are insufficient, conduct was not false or did not prevent Title I rights, and some claims mischaracterize common-law causes | Court: Allegations sufficient at pleading stage; Preston’s motion denied in full (Title I claims against Preston survive) |
| Whether AFGE can be vicariously liable for Preston’s acts (respondeat superior) | Massey seeks to hold AFGE liable for Preston’s Convention‑time acts and post‑Convention acts | AFGE argued plaintiff failed to allege AFGE instigated, ratified, or authorized Preston’s post‑Convention conduct; only liable for acts within scope of authority | Court: AFGE potentially liable for Counts I–II (Preston acting as AFGE sergeant‑at‑arms at Convention) but not for post‑Convention Counts III–V (no allegation AFGE instigated/ratified those acts) |
| Whether Massey has standing to challenge Cox’s takeover of the Local Committee investigation (Count VI) | Massey claimed Cox’s appointment of a National Committee (comprised of Cox allies) would likely prevent relief and frustrate administrative remedies | AFGE/Cox argued Massey’s alleged injury from the takeover is speculative and not a concrete injury‑in‑fact | Court: Dismissed Count VI for lack of standing — alleged injury speculative and not sufficiently concrete or imminent |
| Whether Cox individually was plausibly alleged to have participated in retaliatory scheme (Counts I–V) | Massey contended Cox and Preston collaborated against him | Cox (and AFGE) argued complaint contains no particularized factual allegations of Cox’s conduct or agreement to retaliate | Court: Dismissed all claims against Cox for failure to plead specific conduct or agreement (Twombly standard) |
Key Cases Cited
- United Steelworkers of Am. v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982) (explaining Title I of the LMRDA protects union members’ speech and participation rights and modeled on the Bill of Rights)
- Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526 (1984) (Title I protects voting and participation rights of union members)
- Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431 (1982) (LMRDA promotes union democracy and protects members from arbitrary action by union officers)
- Clayton v. Int’l Union, 451 U.S. 679 (1981) (courts have discretion to require exhaustion of internal union remedies; set three-factor test to decide whether to require exhaustion)
- Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347 (1989) (removal from elected union office in retaliation for protected expression actionable under LMRDA due to chilling effect)
- Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced Rodmen Local 201, 843 F.2d 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (parent union liable only for acts of affiliates that are authorized, ratified, or instigated; respondeat superior principles applied)
- Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 444 U.S. 212 (1979) (principles for holding unions liable for agents’ acts within scope of authority)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (concreteness requirement for Article III standing; intangible injuries must be real and within harms Congress sought to protect)
- R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 810 F.3d 827 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (injury premised on speculative future actions by independent actors insufficient for standing)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility standard for pleading an agreement or conspiracy)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (complaint must plead factual content permitting reasonable inference of defendant’s liability)