Mason v. Shinseki
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3174
Fed. Cir.2014Background
- Veteran Philip Corbin applied for disability benefits; attorney Ken Mason (later substituted by Mariella Mason) represented him under an agreement for direct payment of 20% of any past-due benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d).
- The VA awarded past-due TDIU benefits; the RO initially withheld 20% for attorney fees but then denied Mason’s eligibility for direct payment, notifying both attorney and veteran and stating a 60-day window to file a Notice of Disagreement (NOD).
- Mason filed an NOD 90 days after the RO letter; the RO rejected it as untimely and the Board affirmed.
- The Veterans Court affirmed, applying 38 U.S.C. § 7105A’s 60-day NOD period to denials of direct-fee requests, relying on 38 C.F.R. § 20.3(p) and the VA Claims Adjudication Manual which treat fee disputes as "simultaneously contested claims."
- On appeal, this Court considered whether § 7105 (one-year NOD) or § 7105A (60-day NOD for simultaneously contested claims) governs denials of direct-fee requests and whether deference to the VA’s regulation and Manual is appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denials of direct-fee requests under § 5904(d) are "simultaneously contested claims" subject to the 60-day NOD period of § 7105A | Mason: § 7105 governs because § 7105A applies only to "claims" and direct-fee requests are not claims; the one-year period applies | Secretary: § 7105A applies because VA regulation 38 C.F.R. § 20.3(p) and the Manual reasonably define "simultaneously contested claim" to include direct-fee disputes; Chevron/Auer deference applies | The court held § 7105A applies; denials of direct-fee requests are "simultaneously contested claims," so a 60-day NOD period governs |
Key Cases Cited
- Cox v. West, 149 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (fee-denial appeals to the Board require an NOD)
- Scates v. Principi, 282 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (veteran has direct financial interest in attorney fee claims)
- Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (agency interpretations of its regulations can be controlling)
- Guerra v. Shinseki, 642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (interpretive deference to VA regulations where statute ambiguous)
- Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) (agency interpretations of their own regulations receive deference)
- Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007) (limits and scope of deference to agency interpretations)
- Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504 (1994) (substantial deference to agency interpretation of its regulations)
- Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (interpretive doubt resolved in veteran's favor)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (agencies receive deference when statute ambiguous and interpretation reasonable)