Mason v. Commonwealth
291 Va. 362
| Va. | 2016Background
- At 2:30 p.m. an officer observed a green sedan with an opaque 3"x5" parking pass dangling from the rear-view mirror while stationary on Route 460; he stopped the car under Va. Code § 46.2-1054.
- Driver Tony Jarrett and front-seat passenger Loren Mason were in the car; Jarrett consented to a pat-down and marijuana was found on him; an odor of marijuana led officers to search the vehicle.
- A backpack found in the rear seat contained large quantities of individually wrapped marijuana, other drugs, baggies, and letters to Mason; Mason was arrested and found with cash and a cell phone.
- Mason moved to suppress evidence from the stop, claiming the initial stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion of a violation of § 46.2-1054 (which forbids objects suspended so as to obstruct the driver’s clear view).
- The circuit court denied suppression; the Court of Appeals initially reversed (published panel opinion), then the full court affirmed by a close en banc vote; the Virginia Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mason) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion to investigate a violation of Va. Code § 46.2-1054 | Richards stopped the car for a dangling object but did not articulate that it obstructed the driver’s view; thus no reasonable suspicion | The dangling opaque pass was prominent as the car passed and could reasonably be suspected to obstruct the driver’s clear view, justifying a stop | Stop was supported by reasonable suspicion; investigatory stop lawful |
| Whether an officer’s possible misunderstanding of the statute invalidates reasonable-suspicion analysis | The officer’s apparent belief that any dangling object is illegal shows a legal mistake that negates reasonable suspicion | An officer’s subjective understanding is irrelevant; objective facts available at the time control the analysis | Officer’s subjective law mistake is irrelevant if the facts would create reasonable suspicion in the mind of a reasonable officer |
| Whether facts discovered after the stop may be used to justify it | Post-stop findings (e.g., officer later saying the tag "could" obstruct) cannot retroactively supply suspicion | Only facts known to the officer at the moment of the stop matter; here the dangling tag was visible as the car passed | Court relied on facts apparent to the officer before the stop (the prominent dangling tag) to affirm the stop |
| Whether Mason's Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the subsequent searches/seizures | Evidence flowed from an unlawful stop, so suppression required | Searches and arrest followed a lawful stop and probable cause; evidence admissible | Fourth Amendment not violated; evidence admitted |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (authorizes brief investigatory stops on reasonable suspicion)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (reasonable-suspicion inquiry is based on the totality of the circumstances)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (lawful conduct may, in context, support reasonable suspicion)
- Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (a stop based on a mistake of law can be valid if the mistake is objectively reasonable)
- Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (Fourth Amendment review employs an objective assessment of facts known to the officer)
- Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (officer must point to specific facts forming the basis for suspicion)
- Sidney v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 517 (2010) (an investigative stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment)
- Glenn v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 123 (2008) (standard of review and burden when appealing suppression rulings)