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Marzett, Robert
PD-0071-17
| Tex. App. | Mar 28, 2017
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Background

  • Defendant Robert E. Marzett was stopped in Frisco, Texas, on November 13, 2012 while driving a white Chevy Suburban without license plates; officer arrested him for driving while license invalid (DWLI) and operating without financial responsibility.
  • At bench trial the trial court convicted Marzett under Tex. Transp. Code §521.457; sentence: 45 days jail (probated 24 months), $500 fine, and 8 days confinement as condition of community supervision.
  • Marzett filed pretrial motions: to disqualify the judge, to suppress (challenging the stop and reasonable suspicion/probable cause), to quash the information (challenging statutory definitions and jurisdiction), and sought judicial notice of the definition of “transportation.” All motions were denied.
  • On appeal to the Second District Court of Appeals Marzett raised 13 issues focused on statutory construction (meaning of “transportation,” “vehicle,” “person,” “operate,” etc.), adequacy of notice, constitutionality/vagueness, standard of review, and double jeopardy.
  • The court of appeals issued a memorandum opinion affirming the conviction on all issues; Marzett sought en banc reconsideration which was denied, then petitioned the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument (Marzett) Defendant's Argument (State) Held
1. Correct standard of appellate review Court of Appeals should have reviewed statutory-construction and law questions de novo (no deference) because they are pure questions of law. Appellate court applied its standard and concluded no reversible error. Court of Appeals affirmed without adopting the de novo review Marzett sought.
2. Meaning of “transportation” and related statutory terms "Transportation" is the subject matter of the Transportation Code; failure to define it creates ambiguity and vagueness; doctrine of lenity and fair notice require narrow construction. State: definition of "transportation" irrelevant to substantive elements of DWLI; statutes and record support conviction. Court of Appeals held the term was not material to conviction and overruled Marzett.
3. Reasonableness of the stop / probable cause & reasonable suspicion Officer’s belief that plates/registration were required for Marzett’s situation was a mistake of law; without articulable facts showing statutory registration duties, stop lacked reasonable suspicion/probable cause. Officer observed an unplated vehicle on a public highway; Texas law requires plates on vehicles driven on public roads—sufficient for probable cause/arrest. Court of Appeals found officer had probable cause to stop and arrest; evidence sufficient to sustain DWLI.
4. Sufficiency of information / jurisdiction / motion to quash Information failed to identify which statutory “person” or entity applied; license expired years earlier so suspension-based charge was invalid; trial court lacked jurisdiction. Information adequately alleged elements; prior acquittal in municipal court did not bar DWLI prosecution; courts properly construed statutory elements. Court of Appeals rejected defects and held information sufficient and court had jurisdiction.
5. Request for judicial notice of definition of “transportation” Trial court abused discretion by refusing to take judicial notice of dictionary/legal definition; denial prejudiced fair notice. The definition was irrelevant to the charged offense; trial court properly declined. Court of Appeals held the request was unnecessary and denial was not reversible error.
6. Double jeopardy (prior municipal acquittal) Acquittal in municipal court for failure to display license bars subsequent DWLI prosecution arising from same transaction. Failure-to-display and DWLI have distinct elements; Blockburger test shows offenses are different. Court of Appeals held prosecutions did not violate double jeopardy and affirmed conviction.

Key Cases Cited

  • Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (U.S. 2014) (an officer’s reasonable mistake of law can make a stop lawful)
  • Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for sufficiency of the evidence review)
  • Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (U.S. 1932) (test for determining whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy)
  • Bernard v. State, 481 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (double jeopardy analysis where municipal conviction/prosecution implicated subsequent county prosecution)
  • Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., 466 U.S. 485 (U.S. 1984) (discussion of de novo review principles in appellate consideration)
  • Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (U.S. 1803) (judicial authority to interpret the law)
  • Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (description of judicial law-declaring function)
  • State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (motions to quash and de novo review of legal sufficiency of indictments/informations)
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Case Details

Case Name: Marzett, Robert
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Mar 28, 2017
Docket Number: PD-0071-17
Court Abbreviation: Tex. App.