786 F.3d 491
6th Cir.2015Background
- Plaintiff Marye Wahl, a Tennessee resident, received Omniscan (a gadolinium contrast agent manufactured by GE) in Tennessee in May and November 2006 and first showed NSF symptoms in May 2007; diagnosed in 2010.
- Omniscan doses from 2004–2006 bore two‑year expiration dates; GE argued the product expired by 2008, triggering Tennessee’s Products Liability Act (TPLA) one‑year statute of repose (claims must be filed within one year of expiration on packaging).
- Wahl filed directly in the MDL in the N.D. Ohio in May 2011 under the MDL’s direct‑file order; after pretrial proceedings, the MDL transferred the case in April 2013 to the Middle District of Tennessee as the proper venue.
- GE moved for summary judgment in Tennessee, arguing the TPLA statute of repose barred Wahl’s suit; the district court applied Tennessee law and granted summary judgment.
- Wahl appealed, arguing (1) Ohio choice‑of‑law rules should govern because the MDL court was the transferor, (2) Ohio public policy (Right to Remedy Clause) prevents application of Tennessee’s repose, and (3) New Jersey law should govern (no repose).
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding Tennessee choice‑of‑law rules govern (or, even under Ohio rules, Tennessee substantive law applies) and the TPLA statute of repose bars the suit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which forum’s choice‑of‑law rules control after direct filing in an MDL that is later transferred? | Ohio (MDL) choice‑of‑law should control because Wahl initially filed in the N.D. Ohio MDL. | MDL was not a true transferor; transferee (Tennessee) choice‑of‑law rules should apply because direct‑file MDL cases are treated as if they originated in the plaintiff’s home jurisdiction. | Tennessee choice‑of‑law rules apply; MDL direct‑file does not make the MDL court the transferor for Van Dusen/Ferens purposes. |
| Under choice‑of‑law, does Ohio public‑policy (Right to Remedy Clause) bar application of Tennessee’s statute of repose? | Ohio public policy forbids applying a foreign rule that extinguishes vested rights before discovery; §90 Restatement public‑policy exception should block Tennessee repose. | §90 does not apply to affirmative defenses like statutes of repose; Ohio choice‑of‑law (most‑significant‑relationship) still points to Tennessee. | Repose is an affirmative defense; §90 inapplicable. Even under Ohio choice‑of‑law, Tennessee law governs. |
| Should New Jersey substantive law apply (no statute of repose)? | New Jersey law governs because GE’s drug division and headquarters are in New Jersey. | Tennessee (place of injury) has the most significant relationship; New Jersey contacts are insufficient. | New Jersey law does not apply; both Tennessee and Ohio choice‑of‑law analyses point to Tennessee law. |
| Does Tennessee’s one‑year statute of repose bar Wahl’s suit? | Wahl: repose cannot extinguish vested rights before discovery; equitable concerns. | GE: Omniscan’s expiration dates meant the repose ran by Nov 1, 2009, before Wahl’s 2011 filing. | Court granted summary judgment for GE—Tennessee’s repose barred the suit. |
Key Cases Cited
- Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal courts in diversity must apply substantive state law)
- Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964) (after §1404(a) transfer, transferee applies law of transferor forum to prevent transfer‑driven law changes)
- Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (applies Van Dusen principles when plaintiff chooses a forum to gain favorable law and then transfers)
- Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980) (distinguishes §1404(a) and §1406(a) transfers; improper‑forum transfers justify application of transferee’s law)
- Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 474 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio 1984) (Ohio adopted Restatement (Second) §146 most‑significant‑relationship test for torts)
- Hataway v. McKinley, 830 S.W.2d 53 (Tenn. 1992) (Tennessee adopted the Restatement (Second) most‑significant‑relationship choice‑of‑law approach)