970 F.3d 667
6th Cir.2020Background
- On March 13, 2017 Luke Stewart was asleep in a parked car; officers Catalani and Rhodes approached after a citizen report of a suspicious vehicle.
- Catalani tapped the window; Stewart started to drive away; Rhodes climbed into the passenger side of the car to try to prevent flight.
- During a roughly one-minute episode (≈59 seconds), Rhodes punched and Tased Stewart, the vehicle stalled and moved at low speeds (≈20–30 mph), and twice mounted curbs; at one stop Rhodes shot Stewart five times, killing him.
- Mary Stewart (mother) sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force), Monell against the City, and several Ohio state-law tort claims; the district court granted summary judgment to Rhodes and the City.
- Sixth Circuit: affirmed dismissal of federal claims (qualified immunity because the right was not clearly established) but reversed dismissal of state-law claims and remanded; Judge Donald concurred in part and dissented re: qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rhodes's shooting violated the Fourth Amendment (excessive force) | Shooting an unarmed, nonaggressive driver who posed no immediate deadly threat was unreasonable | Shooting was reasonable to prevent immediate danger (Rhodes unsecured inside vehicle; risk of ejection/kidnap; danger to public) | Court: A jury could find force unreasonable; Rhodes violated Fourth Amendment (majority concludes conduct unlawful) |
| Whether Rhodes is entitled to qualified immunity | Right to be free from deadly force in these circumstances was clearly established | Precedent didn’t place the precise question (officer inside fleeing vehicle) beyond debate; qualified immunity applies | Court: Rights were not clearly established here; qualified immunity shields Rhodes (affirmed) |
| Monell liability against City of Euclid for training/policy | City's training was deficient, evidenced tasteless material and poor scenarios, showing deliberate indifference | No clearly established constitutional right in these novel circumstances; City cannot be liable absent deliberate indifference to a known violation | Court: Monell claim dismissed because no clearly established violation for purposes of municipal deliberate-indifference theory (affirmed) |
| Ohio statutory immunity and state-law claims (wrongful death, assault, etc.) | Rhodes acted wantonly/recklessly; Ohio immunity unavailable where conduct was malicious, in bad faith, wanton or reckless | District court had found Rhodes immune under federal analysis | Court: Ohio statutory immunity is distinct; a reasonable jury could find Rhodes acted wantonly/recklessly—state claims survive; dismissal reversed and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified immunity two-step framework)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (objective qualified immunity standard)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness test for excessive force)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force permissible only where suspect poses immediate threat)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability for unconstitutional policies/customs)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (municipal failure-to-train deliberate indifference standard)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (need for specificity in clearly established-law analysis)
- Smith v. Cupp, 430 F.3d 766 (6th Cir. 2005) (deadly-force analysis where vehicle-related conduct changed during encounter)
- Godawa v. Byrd, 798 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2015) (officer outside fleeing vehicle; qualified-immunity analysis)
- Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2017) (vehicular flight and deadly-force considerations)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (municipal liability requires known or obvious consequence)
- Guertin v. Michigan, 912 F.3d 907 (6th Cir. 2019) (clarity of constitutional right can make liability apparent even with factual differences)