Mary Stamm v. Frederick Miller, 657 F. App'x 492

Early-morning high-speed highway pursuit: Carl Stamm rode a motorcycle after drinking and was recorded at ~104 mph; Deputy Marino pursued and called for backup as Stamm did not stop.
Officer Miller joined ahead of the pursuit, drove slowly in the right lane with lights/siren on, and said he would “try and stay in front of him.”
Video shows Miller’s cruiser moved partially into the adjacent lane, straddled the lane line for several seconds, accelerated in front of Stamm while Stamm changed lanes, braked multiple times, and shortly thereafter Stamm’s motorcycle collided with the cruiser’s rear-left; Stamm died from his injuries.
Disputed facts: (1) whether Miller intentionally blocked/rammed Stamm (i.e., intended to seize by force) or was attempting to get out of the way, and (2) whether at the moment of impact Stamm posed an immediate threat to others.
Procedural posture: District court denied Officer Miller qualified immunity on summary judgment; Sixth Circuit reviews de novo and affirms the denial because material factual disputes remain and, under plaintiff’s version, a clearly established Fourth Amendment right was violated.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Miller’s actions amounted to a Fourth Amendment seizure by use of deadly force	Miller intentionally blocked/rammed Stamm with his cruiser to stop him	Miller was trying to move out of Stamm’s way, not to seize him	Disputed facts exist; a reasonable juror could find Miller intended to stop Stamm, so not resolved on summary judgment
Whether Miller’s use of force was objectively reasonable	At collision point Stamm posed little/no immediate threat to others (wide highway, no nearby vehicles) so deadly force was unreasonable	Stamm’s extreme speed and reckless driving made him an immediate threat to officers/others	Genuine fact dispute over immediate threat; jury could find force unreasonable
Whether Miller violated a clearly established right	Using a police vehicle to intentionally strike a motorcycle is unconstitutional when suspect poses no immediate threat	Miller argues his conduct was not clearly unlawful under existing law	Under plaintiff’s facts, the unlawfulness was clearly established; summary judgment on immunity denied
Whether qualified immunity should be granted on summary judgment	Deny immunity because factual disputes could support constitutional violation and clearly established law	Grant immunity because facts (viewed favorably to plaintiff) may not show clearly established violation	Denied: material facts are disputed and law clearly prohibited intentional vehicle strikes absent immediate threat

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (establishes qualified immunity framework)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (two-prong qualified immunity analysis; courts may decide order of prongs)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness standard for Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force unreasonable where suspect poses no immediate threat)
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) (intent to seize required for Fourth Amendment seizure analysis)
Walker v. Davis, 649 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2011) (officer ramming motorcycle with cruiser is potentially deadly force; relevant precedent on vehicle strikes)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (clarifies "clearly established" right standard)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (existing precedent must put unlawfulness beyond debate)