Mary Cocchiarella v. Donald Driggs
2016 Minn. LEXIS 572
| Minn. | 2016Background
- Cocchiarella alleged she entered into an oral lease with Driggs for Unit 3, paid $2,400 (security + first month's rent), and was told she could move in in a couple of days.
- Driggs thereafter refused to deliver physical possession or keys and told her to return later; he did not return the money.
- Cocchiarella filed an unlawful exclusion ("lockout") petition under Minn. Stat. § 504B.375 seeking recovery of possession.
- The housing-referee and district court dismissed, holding she was not a "residential tenant" because she never physically occupied the unit.
- The court of appeals affirmed, adopting a physical-occupancy requirement.
- The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that a person who holds the present legal right to occupy under a lease or contract qualifies as a "residential tenant" for § 504B.375 even if not physically in possession.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "is occupying" in the definition of "residential tenant" requires physical possession | Cocchiarella: "is occupying" includes present legal right to possession under a lease; physical presence not required | Driggs: "is occupying" requires actual, physical possession (keys, entry, belongings) before petition may be brought | Court: "is occupying" includes present legal right to occupy under a lease or contract; physical occupancy is not a prerequisite |
| Whether a tenant may bring § 504B.375 petition upon effective date of lease even if excluded from physical possession | Cocchiarella: yes — lease creates tenancy and legal right to possession; statute should protect those constructively excluded | Driggs: no — summary ex parte remedy limited to those actually occupying; allowing otherwise risks abuse and dispossessing current occupants | Court: yes — statutory definition and landlord-tenant common law support including legal possession; remedies and procedural safeguards limit abuse |
| Whether interpreting "occupying" to include legal right renders "under a lease or contract" redundant | Cocchiarella: phrase clarifies basis for occupancy (lease vs adverse possession) and is not redundant | Amicus/dissent: including legal right makes the following clause superfluous | Court: not redundant — clause specifies the source of occupancy rights and excludes non-lease possessors (e.g., adverse possessors) |
| Whether policy concerns (false/harassing claims, simultaneous competing petitions) justify a physical-occupancy rule | Driggs/dissent: policy and extraordinary ex parte relief counsel in favor of requiring actual possession to avoid summary, inconsistent orders | Cocchiarella/court: procedural safeguards in §504B.375 (verified petition, judge discretion, landlord remedies) mitigate abuse; policy does not override plain meaning/context | Court: policy concerns insufficient to override textual/ contextual reading; statutory protections address abuse risk |
Key Cases Cited
- Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 870 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. App. 2015) (court of appeals decision adopting physical-occupancy rule)
- Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828 (Minn. 2011) (standard for Rule 12 dismissal; accept complaint allegations)
- Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598 (Minn. 2014) (pleading standard: claim sufficient if relief possible on any evidence consistent with theory)
- Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. 2012) (statutory interpretation: technical words may have special meaning)