Mary Braswell v. Corrections Corporation of Ame, 419 F. App'x 622

Horton, a special needs inmate, was housed in CCA's Metro Davidson County facility and placed in segregation due to behavioral problems.
Beginning in 2006–2007, Horton experienced multiple forcible removals and later a nine-month period in which he remained in his cell without extraction or cleaning.
After May 2007, Assistant Warden Corlew directed a policy restricting force use to emergencies, and staff stopped routinely extracting Horton.
Horton’s cell became filthy and unsanitary for nine consecutive months, with reports of mold, filth, and no shower or exercise opportunities.
Praised whistleblower Perry documented Horton’s condition and notified authorities; Perry was fired and the Health Department investigated Horton's condition.
Braswell filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Eighth Amendment violations, unlawful confinement, inadequate mental health care, and related claims; CCA moved to dismiss and was granted summary judgment by the district court on exhaustion and injury grounds.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether administrative remedies were available to Horton	Braswell argues remedies were available to Horton during confinement and after transfer.	CCA contends remedies were unavailable due to Horton’s mental state and post-transfer custody.	Genuine issue of material fact as to availability of remedies remains
Whether Horton sustained a 'physical injury' under § 1997e(e	Horton’s nine-month squalor caused nontrivial physical injuries beyond de minimis.	District court held injuries were de minimis; Horton failed to show significant physical injury.	There is a material dispute whether injuries exceed de minimis level
Whether a CCA policy or custom caused the Eighth Amendment violations	Braswell contends CCA policy/custom of minimizing force led to Horton’s confinement conditions.	Braswell failed to connect any custom to a policymaker at CCA; liability would be vicarious if applicable.	Material factual dispute as to whether policy/custom caused the violation; remanded for further proceedings
Whether Braswell could pursue § 1983 claims against CCA given Monell constraints	Braswell alleges CCA’s policy/custom caused Horton’s rights violations.	Respondeat superior not available; need policy-maker knowledge and acquiescence connected to CCA.	Court finds sufficient for summary judgment reversal on policy/custom issue; however, proper causal link to policymaker remains fact-intensive

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (establishes municipal liability for official policy or custom)
Street v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 102 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1996) (private prison operator can be liable under color of state law)
Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996) (custom must reflect a deeply embedded, policy-like practice)
Ford v. County of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 535 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2008) (distinguishes policy from custom in § 1983 liability)
Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 606 F.3d 240 (6th Cir. 2010) (policy or custom must be the moving force behind deprivation)
Spencer v. Bou-Chard, 449 F.3d 721, 449 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 2006) (claims of excessive cold or damp conditions can violate Eighth Amendment)
Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 604 F.3d 249 (6th Cir. 2010) (PLRA's physical-injury requirement not de minimis)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (exhaustion of administrative remedies; PLRA defense is affirmative)
City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (policy or custom analysis context for municipal liability)
Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996) (deeply embedded custom with knowledge/acquiescence requirement)