Martinez v. State
327 S.W.3d 727
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2010Background
- Martinez was convicted of capital murder for an offense committed in July 1983 and sentenced to death under Article 37.0712.
- In 2007, this Court granted habeas relief, set aside the death sentence, and remanded for a new punishment hearing to consider mitigating evidence.
- A new punishment trial occurred in 2009 before a different jury, which again sentenced Martinez to death based on Article 37.0711 factors.
- The State sought automatic direct review of the 2009 sentence; Martinez challenged multiple aspects of the punishment-phase proceedings.
- The evidence at issue spanned Martinez’s extensive criminal history, prison disciplinary record, gang affiliations, and lack of remorse, along with the offense itself.
- The Court affirmed the trial court’s death sentence, holding that the issues raised were without merit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Future dangerousness sufficiency | Martinez argues the evidence does not support future dangerousness. | State contends ample evidence shows continued threat to society. | Evidence legally supports future danger; no reversible error. |
| Deliberateness sufficiency (fact-finding) | Martinez claims the evidence is factually insufficient to prove deliberateness. | State argues offense facts establish deliberateness beyond a reasonable doubt. | Brooks overruled Clewis; deliberate standard applied; evidence sufficient. |
| Extraneous offense testimony | Martinez argues admission of the unadjudicated threat was prejudicial. | State asserts relevance to future dangerousness and character. | Admission proper; probative value outweighed prejudice; not reversible error. |
| Confrontation right and use of DeAnda testimony | Martinez contends the Crawford/804(b)(1) requirements were violated by using DeAnda's prior testimony. | State contends testimony was admissible due to unavailability and similar motive. | No Sixth Amendment violation; similar-motive requirement not violated; former testimony admissible. |
| 10/12 rule pressure on jurors | "10/12 rule" coerces jurors to reach a verdict. | State maintains rule constitutional and consistently upheld. | Rule withstands constitutional scrutiny; affirmed as valid. |
Key Cases Cited
- Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) (no factual-sufficiency review for future dangerousness)
- Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (no factual-sufficiency review for future dangerousness)
- Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (standard for factual sufficiency of elements of offense (overruled later))
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) (overruled Clewis; applied post-Clewis standard)
- Wardrip v. State, 56 S.W.3d 588 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001) (factual sufficiency in deliberateness addressed under later rule)
- Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987) (factors for future dangerousness; includes age and history)
- Fuller v. State, 253 S.W.3d 220 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) (offense facts may support future dangerousness finding)
- Sonnier v. State, 913 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (consideration of multiple factors for future dangerousness)
- Kunkle v. State, 771 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (role of prior history in future dangerousness assessment)
- Hunter v. State, 243 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (extensive offenses may justify future dangerousness finding)
- Berry v. State, 233 S.W.3d 847 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (distinguishes when dangerousness evidence is insufficient)
- Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) ("society" includes prison population for future dangerousness)
- Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007) (interpretation of future dangerousness standard)
- Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (Penry I; mitigation instruction framework influencing later cases)
- Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (10/12 rule alignment with death-penalty framework)
- McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (upholding certain sentencing procedures in capital cases)
