Martinez v. Angel Exploration, LLC, 798 F.3d 968

Background

Jesus Martinez, a pumper employed by Smith Contract Pumping (SCP), was injured when his sweatshirt sleeve was caught in unguarded pump-jack belts at Angel Exploration’s Woodbury 2-2 well, severing his right thumb.
Martinez had visited that well 10–20 times before and observed the lack of guarding; some other Angel wells did have guards.
Angel outsourced routine well servicing to SCP (pumpers) and larger repairs to Natural Gas Specialists (NGS); neither contractor provided formal guarding training, and there is no evidence Angel had actual notice the Woodbury pump jack lacked guards.
Martinez received workers’ compensation benefits but sued Angel for premises liability (unsafe condition/failure to inspect/warn) and alternatively for an intentional tort falling within the workers’ compensation exception.
The district court granted summary judgment for Angel: (1) no duty on premises-liability theory because the unguarded machinery was an open-and-obvious danger under Oklahoma law, and (2) no evidence Angel acted with knowledge that injury was substantially certain (Parret intentional-tort test).
On appeal the Tenth Circuit affirmed the intentional-tort ruling but vacated and remanded the premises-liability ruling in light of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Wood v. Mercedes-Benz recognizing a foreseeability exception to the open-and-obvious doctrine.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Angel’s failure to comply with OSHA constituted negligence per se	Martinez argued OSHA guarding rule made Angel negligent per se	Angel argued OSHA duties run employer→employee and Martinez did not preserve negligence-per-se theory below	Forfeited on appeal (not raised adequately below)
Whether the unguarded pump jack was an open and obvious danger	Martinez argued the condition was not open/obvious because of distraction or deceptively innocent appearance	Angel argued the lack of guarding was obvious and thus no duty to remedy or warn under then-existing Oklahoma law	Court affirmed that the danger was open and obvious as a matter of law (no genuine dispute on deceptive-appearance theory); distraction theory forfeited
Whether Wood’s foreseeability exception to the open-and-obvious doctrine applies to this case	Martinez argued Wood creates an exception because pumpers were required to work near the belts and Angel should have foreseen the harm	Angel relied on lack of actual notice and pre-Wood precedent barring duty for open-and-obvious dangers	Remanded: Tenth Circuit vacated summary judgment on premises liability to permit parties/jury to address whether Angel should have reasonably foreseen the harm under Wood (including constructive notice/inspection issues)
Whether Angel’s conduct met the Parret intentional-tort standard (knowledge injury substantially certain)	Martinez asserted exclusive-remedy exception: Angel acted with knowledge injury was substantially certain	Angel argued record lacks evidence of substantial-certainty knowledge; at most negligence/wantonness	Affirmed: no evidence Angel had knowledge of substantial certainty; summary judgment for Angel on intentional-tort claim

Key Cases Cited

Wood v. Mercedes-Benz, 336 P.3d 457 (Okla. 2014) (Oklahoma Supreme Court recognized foreseeability exception to the open-and-obvious defense)
Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 127 P.3d 572 (Okla. 2005) (intentional-tort test for workers’ compensation exception: desire to injure or knowledge injury substantially certain)
Scott v. Archon Group, L.P., 191 P.3d 1207 (Okla. 2008) (premises-liability duty framework and open-and-obvious rule pre-Wood)
McIntosh v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1993) (choice-of-law in diversity actions)
Monge v. RG Petro-Mach. (Grp.) Co. Ltd., 701 F.3d 598 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining Parret substantial-certainty standard)