MARTIN COUNTY, FLORIDA v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
1:15-cv-00632
D.D.C.May 10, 2017Background
- AAF Holdings proposed a high‑speed rail from Miami to Orlando in two phases; Phase II would run through Indian River and Martin Counties.
- AAF sought $1.6 billion RRIF loan (subject to FRA/NEPA review) and requested DOT allocate up to $1.75 billion in tax‑exempt private activity bonds (PABs) in 2014.
- DOT provisionally allocated $1.75 billion in December 2014; the counties sued, alleging DOT violated NEPA, NHPA §106, and DOTA §4(f) by allocating PABs before FRA completed NEPA review for Phase II.
- The Court previously denied motions to dismiss, holding a PAB allocation can be a "major Federal action" triggering NEPA/NHPA/DOTA obligations and that the counties had standing.
- AAF asked DOT to withdraw the 2014 allocation and seek a new $600 million allocation limited to Phase I; DOT withdrew the $1.75 billion allocation and granted the $600 million allocation, after which defendants moved to dismiss as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the rescission of the 2014 PAB allocation moots the suits | Counties: withdrawal is a two‑step scheme; DOT will reissue PABs for Phase II without NEPA, so controversy remains | DOT: rescission removes the challenged agency action; no live controversy; voluntary cessation standard favors dismissal | Moot: rescission eradicates the specific injury; no reasonable expectation of recurrence; dismissal granted |
| Whether there is a reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur | Counties: DOT habitually ignores environmental laws for PABs and will approve future allocations similarly | DOT: future allocations require case‑specific NEPA analysis; Court's prior ruling and changed administration reduce likelihood of repeat conduct | No reasonable expectation of recurrence given case‑specific inquiry, Court's prior ruling, and intervening change in administration |
| Whether interim events irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation | Counties: policy‑level challenge; rescission leaves DOT free to continue unlawful policy | DOT: complaint targets a specific allocation; rescission means relief would be advisory and not meaningful | Effects eradicated; rescission eliminated the only meaningful relief, so suits are moot |
| Whether plaintiffs may refile or otherwise obtain relief in the future | Counties: fear of future similar allocations without NEPA | DOT: future allocations would be subject to the Court's ruling and plaintiffs can sue again if needed | Plaintiffs retain the ability to sue future allocations; present suits dismissed as moot now |
Key Cases Cited
- Already, LLC v. Nike, 568 U.S. 85 (2013) (voluntary cessation doctrine; defendant can’t automatically moot suit by ending conduct)
- County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979) (mootness when interim events make relief impossible or pointless)
- Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (articulating two‑prong voluntary cessation test)
- Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67 (1983) (Article III case or controversy requirement)
- Campbell‑Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016) (discussion of voluntary cessation and mootness limits)
- Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (mootness principles)
- West v. Horner, 810 F. Supp. 2d 228 (D.D.C. 2011) (abandonment of project can render NEPA claim moot)