Marshall v. State, 182 So. 3d 573

Background

In 2005 William Bruce Marshall was convicted of two counts of capital murder for killing his 15‑year‑old stepdaughter; jury recommended death 11–1 and the court sentenced him to death.
One capital count was based on burglary; the other was based on sexual abuse of a minor. Marshall confessed and led police to the body; autopsy showed strangulation and a small vaginal mucosal tear.
Marshall filed a Rule 32 petition (postconviction). The Jefferson Circuit Court summarily dismissed some claims and held an evidentiary hearing on others; it denied relief. Marshall appealed.
Main contested claims included ineffective assistance of trial counsel (guilt‑phase and penalty‑phase), juror misconduct (voir dire nondisclosures and alleged extraneous deliberation statements), and that various claims were improperly summarily dismissed or procedurally barred.
The circuit court (which also presided at trial) credited trial counsel’s strategic choices (e.g., cross‑examination instead of hiring a forensic pathologist, reliance on an investigator and clinical psychologist for mitigation) and found no Strickland prejudice; it also found many claims procedurally precluded under Rule 32.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Ineffective assistance — failure to hire forensic pathologist to rebut State expert (guilt phase)	Marshall: trial counsel should have retained a forensic pathologist to rebut Dr. Shores’ timing opinion on the vaginal tear.	State/Trial counsel: counsel reasonably relied on cross‑examination and chose not to pursue evidence that might further implicate the victim; hiring an expert was a strategic decision.	Denied — court held decision not to hire expert was reasonable trial strategy and Marshall failed to show prejudice under Strickland.
Ineffective assistance — failure to investigate/obtain lease and challenge warrant/search	Marshall: counsel should have obtained a lease showing the victim was not a tenant, so police entry lacked consent.	State: Marshall produced no lease proving Tonya was removed; counsel’s omission produced no demonstrated prejudice.	Denied — Marshall failed to prove what the lease would have shown or that he was prejudiced.
Ineffective assistance — penalty‑phase mitigation investigation / experts	Marshall: counsel inadequately investigated and failed to present mitigation (neuropsychologist, mitigation specialist, family witnesses).	State: counsel reasonably delegated mitigation work to an investigator and a clinical psychologist; reports were unfavorable or witnesses unwilling to help; additional experts found later do not show deficiency.	Denied — investigation was reasonable; omitted mitigation would not have produced Strickland prejudice when reweighed against proven aggravators.
Juror misconduct — voir dire nondisclosures and extraneous deliberation	Marshall: several jurors failed to disclose relevant experiences (domestic abuse, foster care, poor vision) and juror M.J. introduced extraneous medical opinion during deliberations.	State/Court: jurors’ nondisclosures were nonwillful/remote or immaterial and would not have led to removal; juror M.J.’s statements arose from juror deliberation (not extraneous) and were excluded under Rule 606(b).	Denied — no probable prejudice shown; juror deliberation statements not admissible as extraneous and claim can't be proved because testimony was excluded under Rule 606(b).
Procedural dismissals / Rule 32 preclusion	Marshall: circuit court wrongly summarily dismissed multiple claims and refused amendments.	State/Court: many claims were nonjurisdictional and procedurally precluded (waived at trial or on direct appeal) or insufficiently pleaded; court properly exercised discretion.	Denied — summary dismissals and preclusion upheld where claims were waived, inadequately pleaded, or meritless on law.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial‑interrogation warnings requirement)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (jury must find aggravating factors used to impose death — addressed by Marshall but held not to require jury weighing under Alabama law)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (statutory‑factor and Sixth Amendment notice principle cited in sentencing argument)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (scope of mitigation investigation required for effective assistance)
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (counsel’s duty to investigate certain records for mitigation)
Bethea v. Springhill Memorial Hospital, 833 So.2d 1 (Ala. 2002) (Alabama Rule 606(b) and distinction between extraneous information and juror deliberation)
Ex parte Dobyne, 805 So.2d 763 (Ala. 2001) (standard for probable prejudice from juror nondisclosure)
Washington v. State, 95 So.3d 26 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012) (deference to trial court on Strickland findings where same judge presided)
McWhorter v. State, 142 So.3d 1195 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (analysis of juror nondisclosure and prejudice)