Marshall v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 690 F. App'x 91

Pro se plaintiff Kerry Marshall (also "Kerry X"), an MTOI practitioner housed at SCI-Mahanoy, sued prison officials seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief for alleged religious accommodation violations.
Marshall was transferred out of SCI-Mahanoy before appeal, and prior panel opinion found his preliminary injunctive claim moot because of the transfer.
District Court granted summary judgment to defendants; Marshall appealed only the damages claims and some injunctive/declaratory relief issues.
The panel concluded permanent injunctive and declaratory claims were moot due to Marshall’s transfer and earlier law‑of‑the‑case determinations that the complaints concerned only SCIM-specific practices.
The court held RLUIPA does not permit money damages against state officials (either individually or via official‑capacity claims barred by sovereign immunity).
Marshall’s remaining constitutional free‑exercise damages claim was deemed waived/exhaustion-deficient: he abandoned his previously exhausted claim on MTOI‑specific services and failed to exhaust administrative remedies for the Nation of Islam Holy Days claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness of injunctive/declaratory relief	Transfer does not moot requests for permanent injunctive or declaratory relief tied to SCIM	Transfer renders SCIM‑specific injunctive/declaratory claims moot	Claims for permanent injunctive and declaratory relief were moot due to transfer and prior law‑of‑the‑case determinations
Availability of damages under RLUIPA	RLUIPA allows relief for denial of religious exercise (implicitly including damages)	RLUIPA does not authorize damages against state officials; sovereign immunity bars official‑capacity money claims	RLUIPA does not permit damages against state officials in individual or official capacities
Exhaustion of administrative remedies	Marshall argued denial of observance of Nation of Islam/MTOI Holy Days	Defendants argued plaintiff did not exhaust administrative remedies on Holy Days claim; grievances did not raise those specific claims	Claim concerning Holy Days was unexhausted and cannot proceed under PLRA; exhaustion is mandatory
Waiver of constitutional free‑exercise claim	Marshall asserted free‑exercise injury from lack of MTOI services	Defendants argued Marshall abandoned his only exhausted free‑exercise claim on appeal	Marshall waived his only exhausted free‑exercise claim by failing to raise it in his opening brief

Marshall v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., [citation="499 F. App'x 131"] (3d Cir. 2012) (prior panel finding preliminary injunctive relief moot after transfer)
Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2003) (transfer can moot declaratory relief claims)
Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2012) (RLUIPA does not permit individual‑capacity damages against state officials)
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277 (2011) (sovereign immunity bars certain RLUIPA damages against states)
Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (PLRA requires exhaustion of administrative remedies and courts may not excuse failure to exhaust)
United States v. DeMichael, 461 F.3d 414 (3d Cir. 2006) (issues not raised in opening brief are waived)