640 F.Supp.3d 1033
D. Colo.2022Background
- Plaintiff Raymond Marshall was indicted in 2009 (42 counts) arising from his real-estate business and acquitted after trial in April 2012; a separate 2012 prosecution relating to a tri‑party development deal was later dismissed with prejudice in May 2020.
- Linda Dix, Deputy Chief Investigator for the 4th Judicial District, led investigations and prepared charging/supporting affidavits; Marshall alleges Dix knowingly included false statements, omitted exculpatory information, and withheld exculpatory audio recordings and emails from defense counsel.
- Marshall alleges a years‑long conspiracy among Dix, several Colorado Springs City Council members, City officials, and others to sabotage the USOC deal, manufacture charges, and hide exculpatory tapes and emails.
- Marshall’s Amended Complaint asserts § 1983 claims: malicious prosecution, due process (fabrication of evidence), a Franks claim, a § 1983 conspiracy claim, and a Monell municipal‑liability claim against the City.
- Dix and the City moved to dismiss. The court granted the City’s motion in full (dismissing City and individual City Defendants), and granted Dix’s motion in part and denied it in part — dismissing many claims but allowing claims to proceed insofar as they allege Dix withheld court‑ordered discovery (post‑order withholding) related to the 2012 prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of claims arising from 2009 prosecution | Marshall says 2009 acts are part of a continuing violation tied to 2012 prosecution | Dix argues 2009‑based claims accrued at April 2012 acquittal and are time‑barred under Colorado’s two‑year rule | Court: 2009‑based claims are discrete and time‑barred; continuing‑violation doctrine does not save them |
| Absolute (prosecutorial) immunity for Dix’s affidavit and discovery conduct | Marshall contends Dix was an investigator and many acts were investigative (not advocative) and not immune | Dix contends drafting/filing affidavits and related tasks are prosecutorial functions entitled to absolute immunity | Court: Absolute immunity applies to selection/omission of facts (advocative functions) but not to knowingly false sworn statements in the arrest‑warrant affidavit; post‑order failure to disclose evidence is not shown to be discretionary and is not protected at pleading stage |
| Qualified immunity for malicious prosecution / Franks / due process claims against Dix | Marshall alleges knowing fabrication/withholding deprived him of rights and that these claims are supported | Dix asserts qualified immunity — argues probable cause existed even if some statements set aside and law was not clearly established for an investigator | Court: Dix entitled to qualified immunity re: claims premised on alleged false statements in arrest affidavit and COPR affidavits (Plaintiff failed to allege those falsehoods were material to probable cause); but qualified immunity was not resolved as to fabrication/withholding claims based on post‑order suppression, so those claims remain |
| Conspiracy and Monell liability against City and City officials | Marshall alleges tapes/emails and recordings show City actors conspired with Dix to frame him; he asserts final‑policy theory for municipal liability | City contends pleading is conclusory, fails to show agreement, concerted action, or any final policymaker decision causing constitutional violation | Court: Complaint fails to plead specific agreement, concerted acts, or final policymaking decisions; conspiracy and Monell claims dismissed without prejudice against City defendants |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (absolute prosecutorial immunity for advocative functions)
- Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (distinguishes advocate functions from fact‑witness/sworn testimony in affidavits)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (requirements for challenging an affidavit that contains false statements or omissions)
- McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (when malicious‑prosecution and fabrication claims accrue)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires an unconstitutional policy, custom, or final‑policymaker action)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (qualified immunity protects officials unless they violate clearly established rights)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (scope of absolute immunity and distinction between investigative and advocative roles)
- Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244 (Tenth Circuit on absolute immunity for prosecutorial agents performing prosecutorial tasks)
- Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (no bright line between advocacy and investigation; functional analysis for immunity)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading requirements for factual plausibility)
