Marriage of Dalgleish & Selvaggio, B266579

Background

Parties executed a stipulated judgment (Dec. 2009) requiring a "joint real estate appraiser" to value two Pico Blvd. properties as of specified dates; if value increased, respondent Selvaggio would pay petitioner Dalgleish one-half the appreciation within 10 days of receipt of the appraisal report (the Equalization Payment).
Appraiser Larry Sommer prepared a report (sent July 26, 2013) valuing appreciation at $2,192,103, making the Equalization Payment $1,096,051.50; Dalgleish demanded payment (argued due Aug. 5, 2013).
Selvaggio disputed that Sommer had been jointly retained and raised methodological questions; parties did not agree on payment, and no formal engagement letter existed.
Dalgleish filed a postjudgment Request for Order (RFO) to enforce payment and seek statutory interest from Aug. 5, 2013; trial court held evidentiary hearing (Mar. 11, 2015), found the appraisal was joint and ordered payment but initially set interest to run from that hearing date.
Trial court later explained interest would begin March 11, 2015 (ruling the postjudgment enforcement ruling was a "type of final judgment"); Dalgleish appealed that limitation on interest; Selvaggio cross-appealed the joint-appraisal finding.
Court of Appeal affirmed the joint-appraisal finding but reversed insofar as interest was ordered to begin March 11, 2015; it directed interest be calculated from Aug. 5, 2013 (10 days after Dalgleish received the appraisal).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
When did statutory postjudgment interest begin to accrue on the Equalization Payment?	Interest should run from the date the payment was due under the Judgment (Aug. 5, 2013).	Interest could not run until a sum certain was fixed by the court — i.e., from the court's March 11, 2015 ruling.	Interest accrues from the date the payment became due under the stipulated Judgment (Aug. 5, 2013); the trial court erred by starting interest on Mar. 11, 2015.
Was Sommer's report a "joint appraisal" as required by the Judgment?	The communications, Sommer's understanding, and the report itself show a joint retention.	Lack of engagement letter, only Selvaggio paid Sommer, and equivocal communications show no joint retention.	Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Sommer was jointly retained; cross-appeal fails.
Does a postjudgment enforcement hearing convert the dispute into a new judgment for interest accrual purposes?	No — the original stipulated Judgment created the money judgment obligation; enforcing it does not reset the interest start date.	Yes — a ruling fixing the amount is the operative judgment date for interest.	The enforcement ruling did not create a new judgment; statutory interest rules look to when the payment was due under the original judgment.
Did the trial court have discretion to choose a different start date for interest?	No — accrual date is governed by statute and the Judgment; court lacked discretion absent agreement.	(Argued implicitly that court could consider equities)	Court had no statutory discretion to alter the accrual start date in the absence of agreement.

Key Cases Cited

In re Marriage of Pollard, 204 Cal.App.3d 1380 (court held equalization payments under divorce judgment are money judgments to which interest accrues from entry) (discussed principle that payments due under judgment accrue interest)
Wuest v. Wuest, 72 Cal.App.2d 101 (discussed in Pollard; consistent with interest accruing from entry of judgment requiring payment)
In re Marriage of Teichmann, 157 Cal.App.3d 302 (distinguished: mere division of property without a spouse-to-spouse payment may not create a money judgment accruing interest)
Stockton Theatres, Inc. v. Palermo, 55 Cal.2d 439 (a judgment bears legal interest from date of entry even if subject to direct attack)
Jessup Farms v. Baldwin, 33 Cal.3d 639 (standard of review for substantial-evidence review of trial court factual findings)
Lucky United Properties Investment, Inc. v. Lee, 213 Cal.App.4th 635 (certainty principle: one is not in default until the sum owed can be ascertained; discussed in context of when interest/prejudgment interest starts)
Olson v. Cory, 35 Cal.3d 390 (prejudgment interest doctrine—certainty of sum rather than liability governs accrual)