Marqus Stevenson v. City of Seat Pleasant, MD
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3275
| 4th Cir. | 2014Background
- In July 2007 three plaintiffs (Stevenson, Barnett, Howard) alleged unprovoked assault and unreasonable seizure by multiple police officers outside a Prince George’s County nightclub; Officer Lowery (Seat Pleasant) arrested Stevenson; Officer Adey (County) was present.
- Complaint (2009) sued Officers Lowery and Adey (individual and official capacities) and Prince George’s County and Seat Pleasant; counts included § 1983 (¶¶35–36), Excessive Force, Battery, False Arrest, IIED, and Maryland constitutional claims. Several claims/defendants were dismissed pretrial; surviving claims included § 1983 as to Lowery and Excessive Force/Battery as to Adey.
- Appellees moved for summary judgment; district court granted summary judgment to defendants except it preserved Stevenson’s § 1983 claim against Lowery. The court initially held bystander liability was not pled and refused to consider it at summary judgment.
- At trial Stevenson prevailed against Lowery on excessive force; jury awarded $36,000. Post-trial the district court reversed its prior view, concluding ¶¶35–36 did plead bystander liability and granted Lowery’s Rule 50(b) motion ordering a new trial on that basis; the parties settled before retrial.
- Appellants sought relief under Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) to revive bystander claims against Adey and the County; the district court denied relief as untimely and because it found no pleading notice. Appellants appealed.
- The Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo the pleading/sufficiency issue and summary judgment as to Adey and Lowery’s principal liability, affirmed summary judgment for Adey and for Lowery as a principal actor regarding Barnett and Howard, but reversed the summary judgment ruling that ¶¶35–36 did not plead bystander liability as to Lowery and remanded for reconsideration limited to Lowery’s potential bystander liability to Howard and Barnett.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ¶¶35–36 of the complaint sufficiently pleaded § 1983 bystander liability | Complaint’s language that defendants “commit or allow to be committed an unreasonable seizure” gave fair notice of bystander claim | Bystander liability was never pled explicitly and discovery responses didn’t assert it, so defendants lacked notice | Reversed district court’s summary judgment ruling; ¶¶35–36 sufficiently pled bystander liability as to Lowery (case remanded limited to Lowery’s bystander liability to Howard and Barnett) |
| Whether defendants raised Twombly/Iqbal pleading insufficiency at dismissal stage | Plaintiffs note no motion to dismiss challenged factual sufficiency for bystander theory; pleading need not use “magic words” | Defendants argue they lacked notice because complaint did not recite bystander elements or use term | Court held Twombly/Iqbal inapplicable as defendants did not press factual insufficiency earlier; notice assessed by substance, not magic words — pleading adequate |
| Whether summary judgment for Officer Adey on Excessive Force/Battery should be reversed | Plaintiffs relied on affidavits (Barnett) to create disputed facts that Adey committed assaults | Defendants pointed to inconsistent deposition testimony and lack of credible evidence tying Adey to assaults | Affirmed summary judgment for Adey (district court properly discounted inconsistent affidavit as a sham) |
| Whether County is vicariously liable under Maryland constitutional claim for unpled officers | Plaintiffs argued County liable for actions of any County officers who committed or allowed violations | County argued municipal liability requires specific pleading of policy/custom or identified offending employees | Affirmed: reversal of summary judgment on bystander theory only affects Lowery; County not liable because underlying claims against other County officers were not pleaded against County broadly (no Monell basis shown) |
Key Cases Cited
- Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 188 (4th Cir. 2002) (elements and recognition of § 1983 bystander liability)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard for plausibility)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading standard requiring factual plausibility)
- Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2013) (substance of complaint can give notice of causal role without magic words)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom causing constitutional violation)
- Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1999) (no municipal liability where no underlying constitutional violation by an individual)
- Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984) (sham-affidavit doctrine in summary judgment context)