Marquez v. People, 311 P.3d 265

Marquez was convicted at a single trial of attempted aggravated robbery (a crime of violence), second-degree assault (a crime of violence under the circumstances), and two counts of felony menacing, plus habitual criminal status.
The district court sentenced Marquez to concurrent terms for the felony menacing convictions, and ordered those concurrent with the crime-of-violence sentences, which it then ordered to be served consecutively.
The district court based its decision on treating the four violence-related convictions as arising from a single 'crime spree' and felt compelled by statutes to impose consecutive sentences.
The court of appeals affirmed, and Marquez sought review claiming the district court lacked discretion to impose concurrent sentences for the two crime-of-violence convictions.
The majority ultimately holds that the phrase 'arising out of the same incident' is synonymous with 'arising from the same criminal episode,' and the record shows the two crimes of violence did not arise from the same incident.
As a result, the district court was not statutorily required to impose consecutive sentences and must be permitted to exercise discretion; the case is remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether two crimes of violence arising from the same incident must be served consecutively	Marquez contends the statute requires consecutive sentences for two crimes of violence arising from the same incident.	Marquez argues the district court has discretion to impose concurrent sentences for separate crimes of violence.	Not required; discretionary sentencing permitted.
What constitutes 'incident' or 'criminal episode' for mandatory consecutive sentencing	The phrases are interchangeable and mandate consecutive sentencing when arising from the same incident/episode.	Interpretation should reflect legislative intent and the same-episode concept; the two offenses here did not arise from the same episode.	The terms are equivalent in this context; the offenses did not arise from the same incident/episode.
Scope of remand	Since the district court lacked discretion, the court should be directed to impose consecutive sentences.	Discretion should be exercised by the trial court to determine whether to run sentences concurrently or consecutively.	Remand to district court for resentencing consistent with discretionary analysis.

Qureshi v. Dist. Court, 727 P.2d 45 (Colo.1986) (inherent power to order consecutive or concurrent sentences)
People v. Self, 200 Colo. 406 (Colo.1980) (sentencing discretion context for concurrent sentences)
Fuller v. People, 791 P.2d 702 (Colo.1990) (statutory interpretation of incident/episode language)
Robles v. People, 811 P.2d 804 (Colo.1991) (discussion of consecutive sentencing and related provisions)
Miranda v. People, 754 P.2d 377 (Colo.1988) (interrelationship of proof and interrelated offenses)
People v. Trujillo, 860 P.2d 542 (Colo.App.1992) (joinder considerations for multiple offenses)
People v. Rogers, 742 P.2d 912 (Colo.1987) (interrelated proof and single episode concepts)