Marquez Ex Rel. Marquez v. City of Phoenix, 693 F.3d 1167

On July 28, 2007, in Phoenix, Arizona, Ronald Marquez allegedly restrained Destiny during an apparent domestic incident, prompting police entry into a bedroom with Ronald, Cynthia, and Destiny present.
Officer Roper deployed a TASER X26 in probe mode; two darts lodged in Ronald, but range and cramped conditions prevented effective incapacitation from four inches/long-range requirements.
Roper subsequently used the X26 in drive-stun mode for several minutes as Ronald struggled, while Officer Guliano assisted and Destiny was removed from the room.
Ronald kicked an officer; after a struggle, Ronald was wrestled into submission, but later died from cardiac arrest; autopsy noted heart disease and a chest-area burn pattern from drive-stun effects, with nothing indicating the X26 caused death.
The Marquezes sued TASER for failure-to-warn under state strict liability and the officers for Fourth Amendment excessive force and state-law wrongful death; the district court granted TASER summary judgment and rejected the excessive-force claims.
On appeal, the majority upheld the district court’s conclusions about warnings and found the officers’ force reasonable under the totality of circumstances; a dissent argued the state-law claims should have gone to trial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were TASER warnings sufficient as a matter of law?	Marquezes contend warnings were equivocal due to added language on vulnerable populations.	TASER warnings, read in context, adequately warned of risks including exhaustion and Sudden In-Custody Death Syndrome.	Warnings were sufficient as a matter of law.
Was the use of force against Ronald reasonable under the Fourth Amendment?	Marquezes argue continued force after Destiny’s safety was secured was excessive.	Officers reasonably deployed force given Ronald’s resistance, danger to others, and domestic-violence context.	Force was reasonable under Graham and related standards.
Did the X26 constitute deadly force and was any such use justified?	Argues the X26 could be deadly and the circumstances failed to justify deadly force.	Even if deemed deadly, force was justified to arrest/avoid endangering others.	Court assumed but did not decide deadly-forced status; held justification supported by circumstances.
Should the state-law wrongful-death claims survive summary judgment?	State-law claims possible jury question given alleged panic and multiple shocks.	In light of reasonable-force finding, immunity and non-deadly use preclude liability.	State-law claims properly resolved in favor of officers; district court affirmed summary judgment.

Graham v. Connor, 490 F.3d 386 (U.S. Supreme Court 1989) (establishes reasonableness balancing in force decisions)
Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc; examines electronic control device use on resisting suspects)
Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 1994) (not required to use least intrusive force)
Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (court considers warning and necessity when force is used)
Drummond ex rel. Drummond v. City of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (courts address use-of-force context with mentally ill individuals)
Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 136 Ariz. 556, 667 P.2d 750 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (warning-readability standard for consumer warnings)
Garcia v. United States, 826 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1987) (deadly force justification under Arizona law)
Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994) (requires careful factual evaluation of force)