Mark Swanson v. Village of Flossmoor, Illinois, 794 F.3d 820

Swanson, a Puerto Rican detective for Flossmoor PD, suffered a stroke on July 31, 2009, took FMLA leave, and returned 8/19/09 with a doctor’s note recommending “part-time work.”
After returning he used accrued medical leave to work three days/week; he alleges exclusion from investigations and that Sgt. Pulec refused a request for "light duty" (desk duty).
Swanson suffered a second stroke on 9/30/09, was excused from work, never returned, and resigned 12/21/09; he later received a 50% disability pension (not a line-of-duty pension).
He filed an EEOC charge on 9/14/10 alleging national-origin harassment, failure to accommodate under the ADA, and retaliation; suit filed 6/29/11 asserting Title VII (race and national-origin) and ADA claims.
The district court granted summary judgment for the Village: Title VII claims were time-barred (EEOC filing more than 300 days after last active work) and the ADA claim failed because the Village permitted the part-time schedule the doctor suggested and Swanson was ultimately unable to perform essential duties after his second stroke.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness of Title VII claims	Swanson argued later reassignment notice (12/10/09) restarted the 300-day EEOC clock	Village: last day of active work (9/30/09) starts clock; EEOC charge filed too late	Claims based on discrete acts during employment are time-barred; only demotion claim could be timely but fails on merits
Whether reassignment was an adverse action	Swanson: Chief Miller’s notice of likely reassignment was a demotion/adverse action	Village: notice alone, no actual demotion or financial harm occurred	No adverse action — Swanson never returned to work, suffered no material harm from potential reassignment
Causation for reassignment (Title VII)	Swanson: prior racially derogatory comments show discriminatory motive	Village: no evidence linking Miller’s conduct to prior remarks; Miller’s interactions were professional	No causal connection; cannot impute discriminatory motive to Miller
ADA reasonable accommodation	Swanson: Village refused to engage in interactive process or provide "light duty" desk work	Village: doctor recommended part-time work, which Village accommodated by allowing paid leave and a three-day workweek; employer need not provide employee’s preferred accommodation	Village’s accommodations were reasonable; after second stroke Swanson could not perform essential job functions, so ADA claim fails

Nacify v. Ill. Dep’t of Human Servs., 697 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2012) (standard of review for summary judgment)
Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dep’t, 578 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2009) (direct vs. indirect methods for Title VII proof)
Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2002) (300-day EEOC filing rule)
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (U.S. 2002) (discrete acts must be filed within limitations; continuing violation distinction)
Hicks v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty., Ill., 677 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 2012) (demotion can be an adverse action)
Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995) (paid leave can be a reasonable ADA accommodation)
Basith v. Cook Cnty., 241 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2001) (ADA requires ability to perform essential functions with or without accommodation)
Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2002) (material harm required to show adverse action)
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2005) (interactive process requirement under ADA)