Mark Shane Bishop v. Deputy Dale Glazier, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15447

Bishop, driving during a snowstorm in Freeborn County, Minnesota, stopped after his car became stuck in a snow bank; his fiancée and child were in the vehicle.
Glazier, a deputy sheriff, arrived and assisted, shoveling snow and attempting to free the vehicle; he pushed the car back and directed Bishop to steer toward a road surface.
Bishop exited his car with hands raised after Glazier blocked the driver's side door, requesting another officer; Glazier allegedly grabbed Bishop by the throat and shoved him into the car.
Bishop claimed Glazier grabbed his throat and applied pressure for 45 seconds to a minute, restricting breathing, and allegedly told him to quiet down; Glazier denied choking and stated only minimal force occurred.
Bishop reported the incident to authorities and later filed a §1983 suit alleging excessive force under the Fourth Amendment; the district court granted summary judgment for Glazier based on qualified immunity.
The appellate court affirmed, holding Glazier was entitled to qualified immunity because the force used did not clearly violate a then-established right given the evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Glazier’s force on Bishop violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right.	Bishop contends choking and aggressive conduct violated clearly established rights.	Glazier argues the force used was reasonable and did not breach a clearly established right.	No; rights not clearly established; de minimis injury standard applied.
Whether Bishop’s claim survives qualified-immunity analysis given the injury was de minimis.	Bishop asserts any excessive-force violation suffices regardless of injury.	Glazier contends de minimis injury defeats a Fourth Amendment violation at this time.	Yes; de minimis injury and related precedents support qualified immunity.
Whether the court should rely on Chambers and related precedents to determine the injury standard at the time.	Bishop relies on Mayard and Henderson to show violation despite minor injury.	Glazier cites Chambers to show open question and de minimis injury standard.	Chambers controlled; the force did not violate a clearly established right.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court 1989) (analysis of objective reasonableness in deadly force cases)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court 1985) (use of deadly force considering risk and reasonableness)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (Supreme Court 2001) (two-step qualified-immunity framework)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (Supreme Court 2009) (authority to address qualified-immunity questions in any order)
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (Supreme Court 1982) (objective standard for qualified immunity)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (Supreme Court 1987) (clearly established rights must be sufficiently clear)
Rohrbough v. Hall, 586 F.3d 582 (8th Cir. 2009) (legal standard for clearly established rights in Eighth Circuit)
Chambers v. Pennycook, 641 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2011) (open question on injury threshold for excessive-force claims)
LaCross v. City of Duluth, 713 F.3d 1155 (8th Cir. 2013) (de minimis injury framework before Chambers clarified)
Wertish v. Kreuger, 433 F.3d 1062 (8th Cir. 2006) (de minimis injuries can constitute de minimis force)
Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997) (injury threshold considerations for excessive-force)
Henderson v. Munn, 439 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussion of injury impact on excessive-force)
Andrews v. Fuoss, 417 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2005) (injury level relevance in excessive-force claims)
Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2003) (pre-Chambers view on injury conceptos)