Mark R. Krzykalski v. David T. Tindall
150 A.3d 1
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 2016Background
- On Oct. 24, 2009 Mark Krzykalski was rear-ended on northbound Route 130 after a third, unidentified vehicle (John Doe) cut across lanes to turn left; Krzykalski stopped and Tindall struck his rear.
- Krzykalski sued Tindall (and named a fictitious John Doe); jury found both negligent, apportioning 97% fault to John Doe and 3% to Tindall.
- Jury awarded total damages of $107,890 to Mark (about $91,250 non‑economic; $16,640 past wages); Michele (ex‑wife) received zero on her loss‑of‑consortium claim.
- Trial court denied Mark’s directed verdict and post‑trial motions (new trial/additur); excluded certain late‑offered Thomas Jefferson hospital records and sustained defendant’s challenges to some plaintiff theories (e.g., roller coaster causation argument was allowed for defense).
- Appeals by Mark and Michele challenged (1) submission and apportionment of liability to the fictitious John Doe, (2) weight of damage awards, and (3) evidentiary rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury may apportion fault to a fictitious (John Doe) tortfeasor | Krzykalski: fictitious defendant is not a “party” under Comparative Negligence Act so jury should not assess/apportion his fault | Tindall: jury may consider and apportion fault to any potentially responsible tortfeasor, even if unidentified or not presently recoverable | Court: Apportionment to fictitious driver proper; Act’s objectives favor assessing fault of all potentially responsible parties |
| Whether verdict assigning only 3% fault to rear‑ender Tindall was against weight of evidence | Krzykalski: rear‑ender liability ordinarily requires substantial fault; verdict is a miscarriage of justice given injuries | Tindall: there were two independent negligent acts (Doe’s cut‑off and Tindall’s following distance); apportionment was a fact question for jury | Court: No miscarriage of justice; jury credibly apportioned responsibility to John Doe (fact‑sensitive question) |
| Whether exclusion of Thomas Jefferson hospital records was erroneous | Krzykalski: records should have been admitted to support injuries | Tindall: records contained matters not testified to and were offered late; admission would be unfair/prejudicial | Court: Exclusion was within trial court’s discretion; to extent records duplicated expert testimony, exclusion harmless |
| Whether damage awards (to Mark and Michele) were shockingly low | Krzykalski & Michele: medical testimony showed permanent brain and vision injury and large wage losses; awards manifestly inadequate | Tindall: injuries and causation were disputed; jury entitled to disbelieve extent of claimed disabilities | Court: Awards not a miscarriage of justice; jury credibility determinations supported the verdicts |
Key Cases Cited
- Bencivenga v. J.J.A.M.M., Inc., 258 N.J. Super. 399 (App. Div. 1992) (discussed earlier Appellate Division view limiting apportionment to named parties)
- Cockerline v. Menendez, 411 N.J. Super. 596 (App. Div. 2010) (approved apportionment of fault to a phantom driver where UM matters resolved)
- Brodsky v. Grinnell Haulers, Inc., 181 N.J. 102 (2004) (allocation of fault to a defendant discharged in bankruptcy is permissible)
- Town of Kearny v. Brandt, 214 N.J. 76 (2013) (articulated guiding principles favoring apportionment to dismissed or otherwise nonrecovery defendants)
- Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 103 N.J. 177 (1986) (Ramos II) (discussed limits on who is a “party” for apportionment purposes)
- Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2 (1969) (principles on granting new trial where rear‑ender negligence not found)