Mark Moore v. John Thurston, 928 F.3d 753

Background

Arkansas law required independent candidates to file petitions with signatures equal to 3% of qualified electors and to submit a notice of candidacy, affidavit, and political practices pledge by a statutory filing deadline.
The petition deadline was changed in 2013 from May 1 to the end of the party filing period (typically March 1), and petitions could be circulated no earlier than 90 days before that deadline.
Mark Moore, an independent voter and potential candidate, sued in 2014 claiming the March 1 deadline unconstitutionally burdened his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by forcing signature-gathering in low-interest, poor-weather months.
On remand from this Court (Moore v. Martin), the district court held the March 1 deadline was not narrowly tailored and entered relief allowing Moore to file petitions by May 1, 2018; the court later extended related filing deadlines so Moore could submit required paperwork.
The legislature subsequently amended the statute to set the independent-candidate petition deadline at 12:00 p.m. on May 1 of general election years, a law scheduled to take effect in late July 2019, thereby addressing the relief Moore sought.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the appeal is moot after the legislature amended the filing deadline	Moore: legislative change still leaves controversy only if likely to recur; he seeks prospective relief and had a credible intent to run again	Secretary: amendment renders the dispute moot because it provides the relief Moore sought	Case is moot because statutory amendment remedies the challenged provision and no mootness exceptions apply
Whether the March 1 deadline imposed a substantial burden on rights	Moore: March 1 forces signature gathering in winter months when turnout and access are low, burdening candidacy and voting rights	Secretary: March 1 serves compelling state interests in timely certification and ballot preparation	Earlier appellate precedent and district findings recognized a burden; merits not resolved here due to mootness
Application of mootness exceptions (capable of repetition yet evading review; voluntary cessation)	Moore: had credible intent to run in future; absent amendment, issue would recur	Secretary: Moore’s prior failures to file rendered claim moot earlier; legislature’s change cuts off controversy	Court rejects Secretary’s timing argument; finds no exception applies because amendment is not virtually certain to be reenacted and relief was provided
Whether the district court judgment should be vacated due to mootness	Moore: wants judgment to stand as a precedent protecting ballot access	Secretary: asks for vacatur as standard practice when cases become moot	Court declines to vacate; equities and public interest favor leaving district court judgment intact

Key Cases Cited

Moore v. Martin, 854 F.3d 1021 (8th Cir. 2017) (prior appellate decision recognizing burden and remanding for further factual findings)
Libertarian Party of N.D. v. Jaeger, 659 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 2011) (test for burden and scrutiny in ballot-access challenges)
Libertarian Party of Ark. v. Martin, 876 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2017) (statutory amendment can moot election-law challenges)
Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013) (mootness when legislature amends statute)
Phelps-Roper v. City of Manchester, 697 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2012) (mootness and standing interplay)
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right To Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception applied in election-law context)
United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950) (vacatur doctrine when cases become moot)
Arizonans for Official English v. Ariz., 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (discussion of vacatur as appropriate equitable remedy)
U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18 (1994) (vacatur not automatic; consider fault and public interest)
Diffenderfer v. Gomez-Colon, 587 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2009) (legislation as intervening, independent event for mootness analysis)
Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112 (4th Cir. 2000) (equitable factors for vacatur)