Mark Jones v. Nissan North America, Inc., 438 F. App'x 388

Background

Jones, employed by Nissan North America since 1997 as a assembly line technician, sustained a right-elbow injury in 2003 with subsequent surgery in 2004 and a 3% impairment rating.
Jones returned to light-duty work in 2005 and later moved to a lighter “body trim fits” position, performing tasks involving hand tools and hood operations.
In June 2006, a Tennessee chancery court ruled Jones had permanent restrictions (no lifting, no use of power or hand tools) and awarded a 30% permanent disability to the right arm; Nissan interpreted this ruling as imposing restrictions.
Nissan documented permanent restrictions in Jones’s medical file in July 2006 based on internal emails and consulted staff who had not read the chancery order, treating the order as medical restrictions.
Nissan placed Jones on medical leave in July 2006 for these so-called restrictions and, after efforts to find work within those restrictions failed, Jones left Nissan and took a job elsewhere in 2007; Nissan terminated him in 2008 for absence and noncompliance with leave procedures.
Jones sued in federal court asserting ADA and TDA discrimination claims; the district court denied JMOL and Jones appealed, arguing Nissan relied on an unsubstantiated court order rather than individualized medical inquiry.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nissan’s reliance on the chancery order is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.	Jones argues Nissan treated him based on misperceived restrictions from the chancery order, not on an individualized medical inquiry.	Nissan contends it relied on the court’s ruling and acted in good faith to comply with the order.	No; the order did not require the restrictions and Nissan failed to conduct individualized inquiry.
Whether Nissan conducted an individualized inquiry as required by Holiday.	Jones: Nissan did not verify his actual medical condition or capabilities.	Nissan relied on the chancery findings as controlling medical restrictions.	There was no genuine issue that Nissan failed to conduct an individualized inquiry.
Whether the district court improperly applied the honest-belief defense.	Even if believed, Nissan did not rely on reasonably informed, particularized facts.	Nissan reasonably believed it was following the chancery order.	The honest-belief defense was misapplied; no reasonable reliance on particularized facts supported Nissan.
Whether the McKennon after-acquired evidence rule should limit damages.	Jones contends McKennon does not apply to post-discrimination misconduct that arose due to Nissan’s conduct.	Nissan argues McKennon may apply to limit back/front pay.	McKennon instruction was improper and front/back pay limitations should not be based on post-termination misconduct attributable to Nissan’s conduct.
Remand scope on damages.	Damages should be recalculated in light of JMOL. + front pay considerations.	Damages to be determined consistent with a JMOL ruling.	Reverse and remand for a damages-only retrial limited to quantum.

Key Cases Cited

Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, 206 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2000) (individualized inquiry required in regarded-as cases)
Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799 (6th Cir. 1998) (honest-belief rule requires reasonably informed decision)
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court 1999) (two paths to regarded-as disability—misperceived impairment or misperception of impairment)
Wysong v. Dow Chemical Co., 503 F.3d 441 (6th Cir. 2007) (major life activity of lifting and manual tasks; substantial limitation standard)
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (Supreme Court 1981) (ultimate issue is whether decision is based on legitimate reasons)
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352 (Supreme Court 1995) (after-acquired evidence defense in disparate treatment)
Smith v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695 (6th Cir. 2007) (modified honest-belief standard (particularized facts required))
Taylor v. TECO Barge Line, Inc., 517 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2008) (contextual discussion of burden and standard of review)