Mark Javery v. Charles Bolden, Jr.
697 F. App'x 810
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Javery (Lockheed employee) and Dejan (Camgian subcontractor employee) were terminated while working on a Lockheed contract with NASA and filed reprisal complaints under 10 U.S.C. § 2409.
- They alleged they disclosed mischarging of preventative-maintenance funds (wrongful use of contract funds) to NASA, which they claimed was a protected disclosure.
- NASA OIG found the disclosures were protected and were a contributing factor in the terminations; OIG treated the omission in the 2008 statute as a drafting error.
- NASA Administrator reviewed OIG’s report, invited responses from the parties, and received Lockheed’s disagreement and the employees’ replies.
- The Administrator concluded the 2008 version of § 2409 governed, which protects disclosures to NASA only for a "substantial and specific danger to public health or safety," and denied relief because the alleged mischarging did not fit that category.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding the Administrator’s statutory interpretation and denial of relief were not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law; plaintiffs’ delay claim also failed for lack of prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Which version of § 2409 applies | The 2013 amendments should govern or at least protect their disclosures | The 2008 version governs because contract predates 2013 amendments and was not modified before terminations | 2008 version applies (contract awarded 2010; modification with 2013 terms occurred after terminations) |
| Whether alleged disclosures are protected under applicable § 2409 | Disclosures of mischarging were protected whistleblower disclosures | 2008 § 2409 does not cover mischarging disclosures to NASA; terminations were for performance | Not protected: 2008 § 2409, by its plain terms, protects NASA disclosures only for substantial and specific danger to public health or safety |
| Whether OIG reasonably treated the statutory omission as a drafting error | OIG: omission was a mistake and protections should extend to mischarging disclosures | Administrator: cannot rewrite Congress; statutory text is plain and enforceable | Administrator’s rejection of OIG’s ‘‘drafting error’’ view upheld; agency interpretation reasonable and consistent with text |
| Whether Administrator unreasonably delayed final determination | Plaintiffs: Administrator exceeded statutory 30-day deadline and prejudiced them | Administrator: delay occurred but APA relief for delay requires prejudice; proceedings included party responses | Delay did occur but plaintiffs failed to show prejudice; delay does not nullify final decision |
Key Cases Cited
- Knapp v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 796 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2015) (standards for judicial review of agency determinations)
- Mem’l Hermann Hosp. v. Sebelius, 728 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2013) (deference to agency statutory interpretations in administered statutes)
- Tex. Clinical Labs, Inc. v. Sebelius, 612 F.3d 771 (5th Cir. 2010) (deference to agency interpretations on statutory questions)
- Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Bos. & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407 (1992) (deference to agency interpretations where consistent with plain language)
- Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (courts enforce plain statutory text where disposition is not absurd)
- Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for deference to reasonable agency interpretations)
- United States v. Popovich, 820 F.2d 134 (5th Cir. 1987) (court’s remedy for unreasonable agency delay is to compel action; does not vacate completed action)
- King v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 766 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1985) (APA requires showing of prejudice to set aside agency action for untimeliness)
