Mark Hagans v. Commissioner Social Security
694 F.3d 287
3rd Cir.2012Background
- Hagans received initial disability benefits after heart surgery in early 2003 and later underwent rehabilitation.
- SSA updated Hagans’s RFC in September 2004 and determined his disability had ceased on September 1, 2004.
- Hagans appealed, ALJ held in 2009 that Hagans’s disability ceased as of September 1, 2004, and denied benefits.
- District Court affirmed; Hagans challenged the date-of-review rule and the SSA Acquiescence Ruling 92-2(6).
- SSA’s AR 92-2(6) interprets “current”/“now” in § 423(f) to refer to the initial cessation date, not later times.
- This case centers on whether § 423(f) is ambiguous and whether Chevron or Skidmore deference applies to AR 92-2(6).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 423(f) is ambiguous and what standard governs deference. | Hagans contends AR 92-2(6) should be Chevron-deferred. | SSA argues AR 92-2(6) is authoritative and should be Chevron-skidmore balanced. | Statute ambiguous; Skidmore applied; AR 92-2(6) persuasive. |
| What date governs disability cessation review under § 423(f). | Review should consider ALJ hearing/ruling dates to capture later disability status. | Review should focus on the initial cessation date decision (Sept 1, 2004). | SSA's interpretation focusing on Sept. 1, 2004 is affirmed. |
| Whether AR 92-2(6) merits Chevron deference. | Defer to SSA’s interpretation as a reasonable construction of the statute. | AR 92-2(6) is a nonbinding Acquiescence Ruling; Chevron not warranted. | Skidmore deference applies, not Chevron. |
| Whether the SSA’s interpretation is persuasive under Skidmore. | The rule should be persuasive to Hagans due to administrative expertise. | Policy aims and consistency justify deference to AR 92-2(6). | AR 92-2(6) is persuasive under Skidmore and merits deference. |
| Whether Hagans’s substantial evidence supports termination as of Sept. 1, 2004. | Evidence could show ongoing impairment or show relapse or misdated reduction. | Evidence shows medical improvement and ability for sedentary work. | Substantial evidence supports cessation on Sept. 1, 2004. |
Key Cases Cited
- Difford v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 910 F.2d 1316 (6th Cir. 1990) (held ALJ should adjudicate at time of hearing; ‘now’/current unambiguous)
- Johnson v. Apfel, 191 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 1999) (adopted SSA interpretation of § 423(f) as cessation timing)
- Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (U.S. 2000) (informal agency interpretations not entitled to Chevron deference)
- Mead Corp. v. United States, 533 U.S. 218 (U.S. 2001) (broadly analyzes agency deference framework and delegation)
- Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (U.S. 2002) (mead factors; deference to agency interpretations when appropriate)
- Mercy Catholic Medical Center v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 2004) (informal interpretive rules and Skidmore deference in practice)
- Packard v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2005) (brief interpretive letter not entitled to Chevron deference; Skidmore analysis)