Mario Diana v. Williard Oliphant, 441 F. App'x 76

Diana, a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper, went on leave in January 2003 due to a work injury.
In November 2003 Altavilla, Diana’s commander, directed Diana’s return-to-work and indicated benefits could be suspended if he did not return.
On November 21, 2003, Oliphant, on duty, called Diana from a recorded police line at Altavilla’s request, to inform him he must return to work.
The barracks’ phone lines were set to emit beeps; Diana did not hear the beeps and did not know the call was recorded; the recording captured the beep intervals.
Diana learned of the recording through a coworker, became depressed and anxious, and filed suit on November 11, 2005, asserting First, Fourth, Title III, and Pennsylvania Wiretap Act violations.
A jury trial in April 2008 found in Diana’s favor on all claims; district court later reduced compensatory and statutory damages but denied punitive damages, and later awarded attorneys’ fees to Diana.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Qualified immunity on Fourth Amendment and Title III claims	Diana contends officers violated rights; immunity not clearly established.	Oliphant and Altavilla relied on Title III ordinary-course exception and acted reasonably.	Appellants entitled to qualified immunity on Fourth Amendment and Title III claims.
Whether Title III ordinary-course exception can shield Fourth Amendment liability	Title III exception does not preclude Fourth Amendment liability.	Exception should protect actions from Fourth Amendment liability.	Not clearly established; officers could reasonably rely on the ordinary-course exception, supporting immunity.
Pennsylvania Wiretap Act defense under § 5704(3)	Recording was unlawful under the Wiretap Act and not within § 5704(3).	Recording falls within § 5704(3) exemptions for police administrative lines with beeps and available nonrecorded lines.	Appellants entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Pennsylvania Wiretap Act claims.

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (two-step qualified immunity analysis)
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011) (clearly established standard in qualified immunity)
Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2007) (reasonableness of officer's actions under the circumstances)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective standard for excessive force; perspective of reasonable officer)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (clearly established right requires reasonable understanding of violation)
Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2009) (plenary review of denial of judgment as a matter of law)
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993) (standard for granting JMOL)
Adams v. City of Battle Creek, 250 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2001) (ordinary-course exception considerations and policy)
Abraham v. Cnty. of Greenville, S.C., 237 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2001) (ordinary-course exception not universally applied)
Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 1999) (interpretation of 'ordinary' in ordinary-course)
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (constitutional limits on disclosure of unlawfully intercepted communications)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (privacy expectation and surveillance doctrine)
Walden v. City of Providence, , 596 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (Title III rights and the relationship to constitutional rights)