662 F. App'x 221
4th Cir.2016Background
- McCray, an African-American woman who had worked nearly 40 years for the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA), was terminated in October 2008 as part of state budget cuts. She was 64 and diabetic at the time.
- In June 2009 McCray filed an EEOC charge alleging age discrimination; she amended the charge in September 2010 to add race and gender discrimination (Title VII).
- After receiving a right-to-sue letter in December 2011, McCray sued MTA/MDOT in federal court asserting Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims; the district court dismissed based on legislative immunity before discovery.
- On appeal the Fourth Circuit vacated dismissal of the Title VII claim and remanded, concluding some alleged pre-legislative discriminatory acts (stripping responsibilities) could survive immunity.
- On remand McCray filed an amended complaint reasserting Title VII and adding Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act (MFEPA) claims; the district court dismissed those claims as unexhausted and/or time-barred.
- The Fourth Circuit rejects the unexhausted ruling (finding Title VII allegations were reasonably related to the EEOC charge) but affirms dismissal of Title VII and MFEPA claims as time-barred.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title VII claim was administratively exhausted | McCray: EEOC charge alleging supervisor harassment and attempts to discharge her encompassed being stripped of duties that made her vulnerable to termination | Defendants: Title VII claim not fairly encompassed by EEOC filings; unexhausted | Court: Exhaustion satisfied — Title VII "lightning rod" claim reasonably related to EEOC allegations |
| Whether Title VII claim is timely (relation-back of amended EEOC charge) | McCray: September 2010 amendment alleging race/gender discrimination should relate back to June 2009 filing | Defendants: Title VII allegations were new and did not relate back to original ADEA-only charge | Court: Dismissed Title VII as time-barred — amended charge did not relate back under Evans |
| Whether MFEPA claims are timely under Maryland law | McCray: MFEPA action permitted given administrative filings and statutory timing | Defendants: MFEPA requires filing within 2 years of the alleged act; McCray sued after that period | Court: Dismissed MFEPA claims as untimely because suit was filed more than 2 years after termination |
| Status of ADEA/ADA/Rehab Act claims | McCray: (abandoned on appeal) | Defendants: District court previously dismissed on immunity grounds | Court: Dismissals of those claims not challenged on appeal; considered abandoned |
Key Cases Cited
- McCray v. Md. Dep’t of Transp., 741 F.3d 480 (4th Cir. 2014) (prior appellate decision vacating dismissal of Title VII insofar as pre-legislative acts were alleged)
- Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Indus., Inc., 711 F.3d 401 (4th Cir. 2013) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(1) exhaustion dismissals)
- Smith v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 202 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 2000) (EEOC charge must identify parties and generally describe practices complained of; relatedness standard)
- Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954 (4th Cir. 1996) (amendment alleging new theory of recovery generally does not relate back to original EEOC filing)
- Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334 (4th Cir. 2009) (de novo review of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal as time-barred)