944 F.3d 996
8th Cir.2019Background
- Vianney (Marianist Province/St. John Vianney High School) is a Catholic all-male high school in Kirkwood, MO that uses athletics and evening events as part of its religious mission.
- Kirkwood adopted 2012 zoning lighting regulations limiting light trespass to 0.1 foot-candle; existing lights installed before 2012 were grandfathered.
- Vianney installed lights and an upgraded sound system on its baseball field in 2015–2016; contractors warned no configuration could both meet the new standard and safely light night baseball.
- After neighbor complaints, Kirkwood approved site plans but imposed conditions limiting nighttime use of Vianney’s lights and sound; KHS’s older football lights remained unrestricted due to grandfathering.
- Vianney sued asserting RLUIPA substantial-burden and equal-terms claims, a Missouri RFRA claim, and inverse condemnation; the district court granted summary judgment for Kirkwood.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the RLUIPA claims and inverse condemnation claim, but vacated and remanded the Missouri RFRA ruling with instructions to dismiss that claim without prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| RLUIPA substantial-burden | Vianney: lighting/sound limits prevent religiously motivated nighttime use (formation, outreach), imposing a substantial burden | Kirkwood: limits only restrict time/location; alternatives (day games, other fields) exist so no substantial burden | Court: No substantial burden — alternatives are feasible and burden is at most an inconvenience |
| RLUIPA equal-terms (as-applied) | Vianney: Kirkwood treated public school (KHS) more favorably by grandfathering its lights but not Vianney’s | Kirkwood: differential treatment is chronological, not discriminatory; grandfathering depends on pre-2012 installation | Court: No unequal treatment — distinction based on timing of installation, not religion |
| Missouri RFRA (state-law free-exercise) | Vianney: city restrictions violate state RFRA, which appears more protective than federal law | Kirkwood: defended ordinance as necessary for safety/neighbor protection (implicit defense) | Court: District court abused discretion in resolving state RFRA after federal claims dismissed; vacate and remand with instruction to dismiss without prejudice |
| Inverse condemnation under Missouri Constitution | Vianney: lighting/sound limits amount to a regulatory taking | Kirkwood: ordinances are valid exercises of the police power to prevent light/sound trespass | Court: No taking; regulations reasonably relate to health, safety, comfort and are not a total prohibition on use |
Key Cases Cited
- Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (recognizing that alternatives do not always defeat a substantial-burden claim but distinguishing fact pattern)
- San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir.) (requiring alternative sites does not necessarily create a substantial burden)
- Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir.) (relocation/alternative-site reasoning in free-exercise context)
- Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp., 858 F.3d 996 (6th Cir.) (denial of permit not a substantial burden where mission can continue elsewhere)
- Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975 (7th Cir.) (grandfathering based on chronology rather than discriminatory intent)
- Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (pendant/supplemental jurisdiction factors favor declining jurisdiction when federal claims are eliminated)
- United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (comity: avoid needless decisions of state law)
- City of Kansas City v. Tayler, 689 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. Ct. App.) (Missouri precedent that reasonable police-power land-use regulations are not takings)