San Jose Christian College v. City Of Morgan HillSan Jose Christian College v. City Of Morgan Hill
John A. Ramirez (argued), Jeffrey T. Melching, Rutan & Tucker, LLP, Costa Mesa, California; Helene L. Leichter, City Attorney, City of Morgan Hill, for the defendants-appellees.
Geoffrey L. Robinson, Bingham McCutchen, LLP, Walnut Creek, California; Michael S. Giaimo, Robinson & Cole, LLP, Boston, Massachusetts, for amicus curiae Americаn Planning Association.
Roman P. Storzer, Kevin J. Hasson, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Christine Lockhart, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, D.C., for amici curiae The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and Various Christian, Jewish and Muslim Organizations.
Amy Greyson, T. Peter Pierce, Richards, Watson & Gershon, Brea, California, for amici curiae City of Alameda and Sixty-One Other California Cities and Towns.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-01-20857-RMW(PVT).
Before: William C. CANBY, JR., ANDREW J. KLEINFELD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Rawlinson.
OPINION
JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge.
The clash between land use regulations and religiously-affiliated landowners continues. In this case, the City of Morgan Hill (the City) denied a re-zoning application submitted by San Jose Christian College (College). Because we conclude that the City‘s determination did not violate College‘s right to the free exercise of religion, or otherwise run afoul of the Constitution, we AFFIRM the district court‘s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.1
The City approved a conditional use permit authorizing the construction of St. Louise Hospital on a site designated and zoned for low density multi-family residential development. The City subsequently chang[ed] the land use designation on the St. Louise property (the Property) from Multi-family Low Residential to Public Facilities.2 The City ultimately re-zoned the Property as a Planned Unit Development (PUD), thereby eliminat[ing] the need for the use permit and allowing use оf the Property as a hospital, with fewer restrictions.
The Property is the only location within Morgan Hill actually zoned for hospital use. Under the City‘s municipal code, however, [a]ll uses may be permitted in a PUD district, provided such uses are shown on the development plan for a particular PUD district as approved by the city council.
Upon receipt and review of the initial application for completeness and accuracy of filing, the City informed College that its application was incomplete, and outlined the additional information needed to make the application complete. In a subsequent communication, the City informed College of the need to submit the following information, pursuant to
- Site plan: Indicate landscape areas, easements and storm water detention areas. Please note that the PUD ordinance requires a minimum of 30 ft. wide landscape buffer.
- Illustrative building elevations: The illustrative elevations shall indicate the level of architectural detail and quality.
- Landscaping: A conceptual landscape plan needs to indicate the areas of existing landscaping and areas of proposed landscaping. The plan shall also identify the major types of plant material to be used (e.g., The species of trees and parking lot trees to be used, species of shrubbery to be used to screen parking lots, etc.).
The City‘s letter also requested further information regarding the use of the Property, including the number of night classes College planned to provide; the number and hours for its proposed evening sporting events as well as any large events, and whether these events would overlap with peak classroom use; whether the 300-400 people anticipated for Sunday service in the gym would include the students residing on site, or reflected people coming in from off-site; proposed expansions; the location and detail of the lighting proposed for the future outdoor sports field and the number of bleachers; and how many seats College‘s proposed theater/chapel would contain — 500 or 1500.
Somе of this information was required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), which is designed to inform governmental decision makers and the public about the potential, significant environmental effects of proposed activities[.] San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Center v. Stanislaus County, 42 Cal.App.4th 608, 614, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 494 (1996). The City has incorporated CEQA into its zoning code. See
In lieu of providing a second application describing more fully the intended uses of the Property, and allegedly at the behest of the city manager, College presented a scaled back version of its initial application, encompassing the existing buildings only. The cover letter to the scaled back application indicated that College, at that time, did not have a clear enough picture of [its] future facility needs to provide the information [the City] requested. The revised Statement of Operations reflected only 140 residents, and eliminated mention of the gymnasium, outdoor sports field, field house, and chapel/theater uses. A revised Environmental Initial Study stated College‘s intent to enroll a maximum of 400 students, rather than the 1,200 initially mentioned.
Meanwhile, College circulated two editions of its Broadcaster publication. The Spring 2000 Broadcaster communicated to its readers College‘s goals to add a chapel/gym facility and additional housing. The Spring Broadcaster also indicated that there was adequate space for playing fields and future expansion. The Winter 2000 Broadcaster reiterated that thе Property would allow the college to grow to at least quadruple from its current size of about 400 students. The Planning Commission took notice of these communications, and their apparent conflict with College‘s representations.
Sometime prior to the time College submitted its scaled back application, the City endorsed the concept of a community health care foundation, or some other mechanism, to provide an institutional focus on meeting the policy objectives for medical services. The City formed a seven-person Blue Ribbon Task Force on Community Health Care, the purpose оf which was to explore the medical care needs of the community of Morgan Hill, review[] proposals made to the city and discover[] how to meet the need. After considering testimony of community residents and several proposals regarding the establishment of a medical care facility in the city, the task force verified the urgent need for a hospital in the community and recommended that the Property remain zoned for hospital use.
The City‘s staff disagreed with the task force‘s recommendation, observing that there are no specific policies that say that the property in question must be used exclusively for a hospital, and that the public facilities designation which is presently on the site would allow ... public, private educational facilities, and therefore, the use is consistent in that respect. Despite these positive comments, the Planning Commission recommended denial of College‘s re-zoning application.
The City denied College‘s re-zoning application due to College‘s failure to comply with the City‘s application requirements.
College subsequently filed a complaint and requested injunctive relief on the basis that the City‘s zoning process violated the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),
The district court granted the City‘s motion, and College timely filed a notice of appeal to this court. On appeal, College contends that the district court‘s grant of summary judgment was improper because: (1) the district court applied the wrong legal standard in determining the validity of College‘s free exercise claim; (2) College successfully demonstrated the existence of a hybrid claim; (3) the district court applied old and inapplicable free exercise law to the RLUIPA analysis; (4) the application of CEQA regulations to College‘s re-zoning application substantially burdened its religious exercise; and (5) the City‘s finding that College failed to comply with CEQA regulations was not supported by substantial evidence.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo a district court grant of summary judgment.
III. DISCUSSION
A. The City‘s Denial of College‘s Rezoning Application Did Not Deprive College of its First Amendment Right to the Free Exercise of Religion.
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been made applicable to the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... Employment Div., Oregon Dep‘t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990) (citing
Smith held that a neutral law of general application could prohibit conduct that was prescribed by an individual‘s religion; such a law did not have to be supported by a compelling governmental interest even thоugh it had the incidental effect of burdening religion. See id. at 885. Smith also rejected a requirement of a compelling interest when the burden on religion is substantial. Id. at 883-84, 110 S.Ct. 1595.3
A few years after Smith, the United States Supreme Court decided Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). In Lukumi, the city of Hialeah enacted an ordinance prohibiting the public sacrifice of animals. See id. at 527, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The prohibition prevented participation in an integral part of the sect‘s worship rituals. See id. at 524-25, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Prior to finding a free exercise violation, the Supreme Court first summarized the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Id. at 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (citation omitted). It is only if a law is not neutral or not of general applicability that we examine the compelling governmental interest and narrowly tailored prongs of the inquiry. Id. at 531-32, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Accordingly, a free exercise violation hinges on showing that the challenged law is either not neutral or not generally applicable. American Family Ass‘n, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 886, 123 S.Ct. 129, 154 L.Ed.2d 146 (2002) (citation omitted).4
In Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir.1999), we held that the rational basis test applies in ascertaining whether a neutral law of general applicability violate[s] the right to free exercise of religion even though the law incidentally burdens a particular religious belief or practice. (citations omitted). See also Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir.2002) (The [Supreme] Court [has] held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices, even when not supported by a compelling government interest.) (citation omitted). However, the First Amendment [still] bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action if the law implicates not only the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press[.] Smith, 494 U.S. at 881, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (citations omitted). In such hybrid cases, the law or action must survive strict scrutiny. Miller, 176 F.3d at 1204.
Three principles of First Amendment law may be distilled from the above-mentioned authоrities. If the zoning law is of general application and is not targeted at religion, it is subject only to rational basis scrutiny, even though it may have an incidental effect of burdening religion. If such a law burdens the free exercise of religion and some other constitutionally-protected activity, there is a First Amendment violation unless the strict scrutiny test is satisfied (i.e., the law is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest). This type of First Amendment claim is sometimes described as a hybrid rights claim. Id. Similarly, if the zoning law is not neutral or generally applicable, but is directed toward and burdens the free exercise of religion, it must meet the strict scrutiny tеst. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Finally, if the zoning law only incidentally burdens the free exercise of religion, with the law being both neutral and generally applicable, it passes constitutional muster unless the law is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. See Miller, 176 F.3d at 1206.
1. The Ordinance‘s Incidental Burden On College‘s Free Exercise Right Is Lawful Due To Its Neutrality And General Applicability.
A law is one of neutrality and general applicability if it does not aim to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, and if it does not in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief[.] Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 543, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The ordinance and its application by the City fall within these parameters. The record reflects that the city‘s zoning ordinance applies throughout the entire City, and there is not even a hint that College was targeted on the basis of religion for varying treatment in the City‘s application of the ordinance. We are left, then, with the unavoidable conclusion that the incidental burden upon College‘s free exercise of religion is not violative of the First Amendment.
2. College Has Not Asserted A Viable Hybrid Rights Claim.
We have previously observed that to assert a hybrid-rights claim, a free exercise plaintiff must make out a colorable claim that a companion right has been violated-that is, а fair probability or a likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the merits.
a. College Has Not Asserted a Colorable Claim that the City‘s Application of its Zoning Laws Abridged College‘s Freedom of Speech.
Citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986) for the proposition that [l]and use laws are subject to First Amendment scrutiny, College argues that the City‘s refusal to rezone the Property for educational use violates its rights to free sрeech. Specifically, College contends that the facilities comprising the Property constitute symbolic speech (i.e., that the building itself is speech). College additionally asserts that its desire to use the facilities to educate persons concerning religion, i.e., to transmit ideas ... is undeniably speech protected by the First Amendment. We note that free speech, arguably, is not even implicated by the PUD ordinance. The City‘s ordinance is materially dissimilar from that at issue in Renton, where the ordinance did not allow a particular type of speech — adult speech — in certain locales. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 43, 106 S.Ct. 925. In contrast, the City‘s PUD ordinance does not at all prohibit the establishment of religiously-affiliated educational institutions. Indeed, under
The record reflects no indication that the City‘s action was motivated by the City‘s disdain of College‘s religious orientation, or by the message to be communicated to the students/parishioners at the Property. Thus, no viable impingement of speech claim has been asserted.
More importantly, in Renton the Supreme Court ruled that zoning ordinances that do not ban speech, but merely designate where such speech may occur, should be properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation. Id. at 46, 106 S.Ct. 925 (citations omitted). If the regulation is content-neutral, it will be upheld against a First Amendment challenge so long as it furthers a substantial governmental interest and does not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350, 353 (9th Cir.1992), citing Renton, 475 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 925.5
A zoning restriction on speech is content-based only if the ordinance is shown to be a pretext for suppressing expression. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48, 54, 106 S.Ct. 925 (citation omitted). If the PUD ordinancе, or the enforcement thereof, serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression[, it] is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some forms of speech. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (citation omitted).
The language of the City‘s PUD ordinance reveals no content-based orientation, and College has presented no evidence that the City enacted and/or enforced the PUD ordinance as a pretext for suppressing expression. Rather the ordinance is a content-neutral time, place and manner restriction, which has long been held to be permissible ... Howard v. City of Burlingame, 937 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir.1991) (citations omitted).
Citing N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), College also argues that its First Amendment right to free association was abridged by the City‘s denial of the rezoning application.
Accepting as true, as we must, College‘s assertion that its collective and basic goals are to gather[] together ... for the purpose of education and worship, it simply does not follow that the PUD ordinance, or the City‘s application of it, imposes a serious burden upon, affects in any significant way, or substantially restrains College‘s efforts to do so. Admittedly, the PUD ordinance and the City‘s enforcement thereof render College unable to provide education and/or to worship at the Property. But the fact that the church‘s congregants cannot assemble at that precise location does not equate to a denial of assembly altogether. See Christian Gospel Church, 896 F.2d at 1224.
3. Conclusion.
A review of the record in this case and controlling case authority leads us to the conclusion that the City‘s denial of College‘s re-zoning application did not deprive College of its First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.
B. The City‘s Denial of the Re-zoning Application Did Not Violate RLUIPA.
Congress enacted RLUIPA,
We have upheld RLUIPA as a constitutional exercise of Congress’ spending power. See Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.2002), cert. den. sub nom., Alameida v. Mayweathers, 124 S.Ct. 66, 157 L.Ed.2d 30 (2003). Under RLUIPA, College bears the burden of persuasion on whether the zoning laws, or the City‘s application of those laws to College, substantially burdens its exercise of religion.
RLUIPA defines religious exercise to include any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.
RLUIPA does not define substantial burden. As always, however, [o]ur duty, in matters of statutory construction, is to give effect to the intent of Congress.
To determine the plain meaning of a term undefined by a statute, resort to a dictionary is permissible. See United States v. Sherburne, 249 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.2001). A burden is something that is oppressive. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 190 (7th ed.1999). Substantial, in turn, is defined as considerable in quantity or significantly great. MERRIAM-WEBSTER‘S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1170 (10th ed.2002). Thus, for a land use regulation to impose a substantial burden, it must be oppressive to a significantly great extent. That is, a substantial burden on religious exercise must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.
Fusing the provisions of
College identifies the substantial burden in this case as its inability to use its own property to carry on its mission[s] of Christian еducation and transmitting its religious beliefs. As stated previously, however, it appears that College is simply adverse to complying with the PUD ordinance‘s requirements. The City‘s ordinance imposes no restriction whatsoever on College‘s religious exercise; it merely requires College to submit a complete application, as is required of all applicants. Should College comply with this request, it is not at all apparent that its re-zoning application will be denied.
Our holding is entirely consistent with the Seventh Circuit‘s recent ruling in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir.2003). At issue in Civil Liberties was the application of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance (CZO) to several local churches attempting to establish new sites within thе city. Churches were required to obtain Special Use approval in order to locate within business and commercial zones, id. at 755, as were clubs, lodges, meeting halls, recreation buildings, and community centers. Id. at 758. Special Use approval [was] expressly conditioned upon the design, location, and operation of the proposed use consistent with the protection of public health, safety, and welfare, and the proposed use [could] not substantially injure the value of neighboring property. id. at 755 (citation omitted). The local churches repeatedly applied for — and were denied — speciаl use permits. The churches then sued the city, claiming, in relevant part, that the CZO violated RLUIPA, as well as their rights under the Free Exercise clause. They maintained that their Free Exercise claim involved hybrid rights of free exercise, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and equal protection, such that Chicago had to justify the CZO‘s incidental burdens on church location with a compelling state interest. Id. at 765.
As in the Civil Liberties case, the City‘s regulations in this case do not render religious exercise effectively impracticable. As noted above, while the PUD ordinance may have rendered College unable to provide education and/or worship at the Property, there is no evidence in the record demonstrating that College was precluded from using other sites within the city. Nor is there any evidence that the City would not impose the same requirements on any other entity seeking to build something other than a hospital on the Property. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court‘s entry of summary judgment in favor of the City on College‘s RLUIPA claim.
C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Granted Summary Judgment in Favor of the City on College‘s Claim Addressing the California Environmental Quality Act Requirements.
RLUIPA‘s general rule applies only when a land use regulation, or the government‘s application of а land use regulation, substantially burdens a religious adherent‘s religious exercise in a way not representing the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling governmental interest. RLUIPA specifically defines a land use regulation as:
[A] zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or restricts a claimant‘s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to acquire such an interest.
Under this definition, a government agency implеments a land use regulation only when it acts pursuant to a zoning or landmarking law that limits the manner in which a claimant may develop or use property in which the claimant has an interest. Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 434 (6th Cir.2002).
College maintains that the City‘s enforcement of the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) is a land use regulation within the meaning of RLUIPA. We need not decide whether, in the circumstances of this case, CEQA is a land use regulation within the meaning of RLUIPA. Assuming, without deciding, that CEQA is such a land use regulation, the strict scrutiny requirements of RLUIPA are not triggered because the CEQA requirements in this case did not impose a substantial burden on College‘s free exercise of religion. See RLUIPA,
We have already determined that the City‘s denial of the rezoning application did not impose a substantial burden on College‘s free exercise of religion. CEQA adds nothing to the inconvenience otherwise imposed by the City‘s zoning application requirements. It does not burden the College‘s free exercise of religion to be required to delineate the nature and scope of proposed development in order to permit the City to assess its environmental effects. Compliance with the City‘s request will not affect College‘s free exercise of religion. College‘s RLUIPA claim with regard to CEQA accordingly fails.
The City based its finding that College failed to comply with the CEQA regulations on the fact that College‘s environmental analysis [did not] consider the foreseeable future development and potential impacts of such development... In making its finding, the City took notice of the discrepancy between the plans submitted to the City in College‘s application and the far more grandiose plans touted in College‘s newsletters. It was reasonable for the City to conclude that the truncated plans were proffered to the City to avoid addressing the envirоnmental impacts of the more ambitious plans. See, e.g., Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of Univ. of California, 47 Cal.3d 376, 396, 253 Cal.Rptr. 426, 764 P.2d 278 (1988); see also City of Redlands v. County of San Bernardino, 96 Cal.App.4th 398, 409-10, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 582 (2002) (holding that County failed to comply with CEQA because it failed to adequately consider reasonably anticipated future development).
IV. CONCLUSION
We conclude that the City‘s zoning requirements are general laws of neutral application that do not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. We further conclude that neither the zoning laws nor CEQA impose a substantial burden on College‘s free exercise of religion and that, accordingly, the strict scrutiny requirement of RLUIPA is not triggered. The City reasonably determined that College had failed to meet the requirements of its zoning ordinance and CEQA. Because College failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding its claims, entry of summary judgment in favor of the City was appropriate. See King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1090 (9th Cir.2002). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
JOHNNIE B. RAWLINSON
CIRCUIT JUDGE