Maria Rutenburg v. Twitter, Inc., 21-16074

Plaintiff Rutenberg sued after Twitter moderated and suspended former President Trump’s account, alleging a First Amendment violation based on state-action by Twitter.
The district court dismissed Rutenberg’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied leave to amend as futile; Rutenberg appealed.
Rutenberg’s operative theory relied on § 1983 (and alternatively Bivens or § 1343(a)(3) on appeal) asserting Twitter acted under color of state law when moderating Trump’s speech.
The complaint acknowledged Twitter exercised its own discretion and acted as President Trump’s opponent when moderating his account.
The district court found insufficient factual allegations to show a close nexus or joint action with the government, or that Twitter performed a traditional, exclusive public function.
Rutenberg’s proposed amendments on appeal added no facts sufficient to cure the pleading defects; the panel affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Twitter’s moderation is state action under the First Amendment	Twitter’s actions were effectively governmental (delegated authority), so First Amendment applies	Twitter is a private actor exercising independent discretion; not a state actor	Not state action; dismissal proper
Whether there was a “close nexus” or joint action with the President	Twitter coordinated with the government or acted at its behest	No willful participation or joint activity with government actors	No close nexus; state-action test not met
Whether Twitter performed a traditional, exclusive public function	Moderating platform speech is a public function delegated by the President	Content moderation is not an activity historically and exclusively performed by government	Not a public function; no state action under public-function test
Whether denial of leave to amend was an abuse of discretion	Leave to amend should have been allowed to plead additional facts	Amendments would be futile; plaintiff already had opportunity	Denial affirmed; further amendment would be futile

Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020) (First Amendment restricts government action, not private platforms)
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288 (state-action requires a close nexus between private conduct and the government)
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (state-action requires willful participation in joint activity to charge private party)
Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 139 S. Ct. 1921 (2019) (hosting or moderating third-party speech is not inherently a traditional public function)
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (private sanctions against public officials do not necessarily constitute state action)
Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 1989) (abuse-of-delegation doctrine does not convert private action into state action)
Beckington v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 926 F.3d 595 (9th Cir. 2019) (pleading requires a cognizable legal theory and well-pleaded nonconclusory facts)
Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (denial of leave to amend reviewed for abuse of discretion)