Maria Christina Gomez v. the City of Houston, 587 S.W.3d 891

On rainy Christmas Eve, Maria Christina Gomez entered an intersection on a green light and was struck when a Houston police cruiser driven by Officer Bobby Joe Simmons slid into the intersection while responding to an armed-robbery call.
Simmons testified he used overhead emergency lights (but not siren) and was traveling at or below the 35 mph speed limit; he looked down to adjust his radio and could not stop on the wet road.
Officer Isaac Jefferson’s investigation report and Gomez’s affidavit state Simmons was not using overhead emergency lights; Jefferson found Simmons at fault and Simmons received a reprimand admitting fault.
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity via official immunity (good faith emergency response) and the emergency exception to liability; the trial court granted the plea and dismissed Gomez’s suit.
En banc the Fourteenth Court reversed: the City failed to conclusively prove Simmons’s good faith because its witnesses’ opinions assumed a disputed fact (that the lights were on), and there is a material fact issue whether Simmons acted recklessly (so the emergency exception may not apply).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Gomez)	Defendant's Argument (City)	Held
Whether the City proved official immunity (good faith) as a matter of law	City failed to prove good faith because witnesses assumed disputed fact that Simmons used overhead lights; thus immunity not established	Simmons acted in good faith; a reasonably prudent officer could have believed his actions justified	Reversed: City did not conclusively prove good faith because its opinions rested on a disputed factual premise (use of emergency lights)
Whether the emergency exception to waiver bars Gomez’s claim (recklessness/conscious indifference)	Evidence (speed in wet conditions, looking away, not using lights/siren) raises fact issue that officer acted recklessly	Officer’s conduct complied with emergency-response considerations; no reckless disregard shown	Reversed: material fact issue exists whether Simmons acted recklessly, so emergency exception not resolved for City as a matter of law
Whether expert/opinion testimony that assumes disputed facts can establish good faith	Assumed facts undermine conclusiveness; plaintiff need only show no reasonable officer could have believed actions justified under the record	City: disputed factual issues are immaterial if a reasonable officer could have reached same decision	Court: an opinion that assumes the truth of disputed facts cannot conclusively establish good faith; the City failed that burden

Bland Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) (subject‑matter jurisdiction standard for jurisdictional pleas)
Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (consider evidence when jurisdictional facts are challenged)
Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1997) (good faith measured by objective legal reasonableness; need/risk balancing)
Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. 2002) (government must prove a reasonably prudent officer could have believed conduct justified)
Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Bonilla, 481 S.W.3d 640 (Tex. 2015) (focus on what a reasonable officer could have believed; need/risk factors and alternatives)
City of San Antonio v. Ytuarte, 229 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2007) (fact issues and explanation of effect on good‑faith analysis)
City of San Antonio v. Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. 2006) (scope of exceptions to waiver under the Tort Claims Act)
City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1998) (recklessness standard for emergency‑vehicle operators)
Green v. Alford, 274 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) (opinion based on assumed/disputed facts cannot conclusively establish good faith)
City of Pasadena v. Belle, 297 S.W.3d 525 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009) (application of good‑faith and emergency‑response analysis)