Margaret Pasqua v. County of Hunterdon
16-3585
| 3rd Cir. | Jan 10, 2018Background
- Pasqua (CFO/Treasurer) and Browne (Director of Finance) were county finance officers responsible for budgeting and maintaining financial records; both appointed in 2008.
- A 2013 outside audit concluded the County’s finances were mismanaged; County charged both with neglect, incompetence, failure to complete reports, insubordination, and related offenses.
- A joint, nine-day disciplinary hearing before an impartial Hearing Officer produced testimony and exhibits; the Hearing Officer issued a preliminary and later final report recommending termination.
- The Hunterdon County Board unanimously voted to terminate both employees in December 2013; Appellants sued in state court asserting (inter alia) political-discharge claims under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 40A:9-25 and Browne asserted federal and state due process claims based on reputational/stigma injury.
- District Court (after removal) granted summary judgment for County: dismissed political-discharge claims because the employees’ advice fell within their official duties (thus not constitutionally protected speech), and dismissed Browne’s federal/state due process claims for failure to show public dissemination of false, stigmatizing statements; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Browne had a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in reputation requiring name-clearing pretermination hearing | Browne: County impugned her reputation without proper pretermination process; stigma-plus triggers due process | County: No public dissemination of false stigmatizing statements; absolute privilege shields statements in administrative proceedings | Held: Dismissed—plaintiff failed stigma-plus: no evidence of public dissemination and statements at the hearing are privileged |
| Whether the pretermination hearing afforded sufficient procedural due process | Browne: joint hearing and reliance on Preliminary Report denied adequate process | County: Browne received notice, counsel, nine days of hearings, exhibits, and written decisions; process was adequate | Held: Dismissed—Loudermill standards satisfied (notice and opportunity to respond) |
| Whether advice to a Freeholder advocating a tax increase was protected speech (political discharge under § 40A:9-25 analogized to First Amendment) | Pasqua/Browne: they were terminated for giving politically unpopular fiscal advice; § 40A:9-25 prohibits removals for political reasons | County: Their advice was within their official duties (budget development and fiscal recommendations), so not protected speech under Garcetti/Lane | Held: Dismissed—speech was within job duties, not protected; summary judgment for County |
| Whether the state-law political-discharge claim required different analysis or survived summary judgment | Appellants: § 40A:9-25 provides independent protection; factual issues (e.g., Board members’ knowledge) preclude summary judgment | County: Federal First Amendment framework applies and resolves the claim because conduct falls within duties; no genuine factual dispute to save claim | Held: Dismissed—court applied First Amendment analysis and resolved claim against plaintiffs |
Key Cases Cited
- Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (public-employee speech pursuant to official duties is not protected by First Amendment)
- Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (speech outside ordinary job duties may be protected; focus is whether speech is within scope of duties)
- Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225 (stigma-plus test for reputational liberty interest)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (pretermination due process: notice and opportunity to respond)
- Senna v. Florimont, 958 A.2d 427 (N.J. absolute privilege for statements in administrative proceedings)
- Loigman v. Twp. Comm. of Twp. of Middletown, 889 A.2d 426 (explaining necessity of absolute privilege in judicial/administrative process)
- Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225 (reputation alone is not protected by Due Process Clause)
- Galli v. New Jersey Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265 (political-discharge framework and element that conduct must be constitutionally protected)