Marek v. State of Rhode Island, 702 F.3d 650

Marek owns a home on Grassy Pond Road in Hopkinton, RI; Hopkinton Associates proposed a 76-unit Kenney Hill Farm Estates on a 192-acre tract adjacent to Marek.
The Hopkinton Planning Board approved the subdivision on the condition that Grassy Pond Road be reconfigured and reconstructed.
The road work implicated wetlands and required a RI DEM permit, which the DEM granted based on surveys and maps prepared by Commonwealth Engineers (retained by the developer).
Marek challenged the DEM permit in the administrative process, contending the surveys were flawed and the road would encroach on his land; the DEM dismissed for lack of standing and denied his motion to reopen.
Marek then sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting various constitutional and state-law claims related to the permitting process; the district court dismissed federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims; Williamsons ripeness analysis was central to the takings claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the takings claim is ripe for federal review.	Marek argues the DEM final decision required under Williamson County constitutes ripeness.	Rhode Island and others assert the plaintiff failed to pursue just compensation in state court; ripeness not satisfied.	The takings claim is not ripe; state-process exhaustion required for just compensation was not pursued.
Whether Rhode Island inverse condemnation provides an adequate state remedy.	Marek contends the inverse condemnation path could support just compensation.	The state provides an adequate inverse condemnation remedy.	Inverse condemnation is an adequate state remedy; plaintiff failed to pursue it in state court.
Whether the Fourth Amendment claim is moot.	Marek asserts ongoing seizure from the allegedly approved road work.	Permit expiration moots the claim; no likelihood of renewed permit is shown.	The Fourth Amendment claim is moot.
Whether the case is barred by mootness exceptions.	The claim could recur if a permit is refiled, capable of repetition yet evading review.	The exception does not apply; unlikely recurrence and no imminent permit reissuance.	The mootness exception does not apply; case properly dismissed.

Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (two-step ripeness for regulatory takings claims; final decision and just compensation)
Downing/Salt Pond Partners v. Rhode Island, 643 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2011) (ripeness and adequacy of state remedies; inverse condemnation pathway)
Annicelli v. Town of S. Kingstown, 463 A.2d 133 (R.I. 1983) (inverse condemnation recognized in state court for compensation)
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003) (inverse condemnation/adequacy of state remedies)
Cruz v. Farquharson, 252 F.3d 530 (1st Cir. 2001) (capability of repetition but evading review standard)
Oakville Dev. Corp. v. FDIC, 986 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1993) (limits on mootness exceptions)
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (mootness and timely relief principles)
New Eng. Reg'l Council of Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (mootness and reviewability of regulatory challenges)
Eaton v. Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 626 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2010) (judicial efficiency; defer to district court decision)
Seaco Ins. Co. v. Davis-Irish, 300 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 2002) (respect for district court’s factual and legal conclusions)
Ayala v. Union de Tronquistas de P.R., Local 901, 74 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 1996) (procedural posture and appellate review standards)
In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 989 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (administrative and regulatory review principles)