Marcus Jones v. Dewayne Hendrix, 8 F.4th 683

Marcus DeAngelo Jones was convicted in 2000 of making false statements to acquire a firearm and two counts of felon-in-possession; one felon-in-possession conviction was later vacated on ineffective-assistance grounds.
Jones repeatedly pursued §2255 relief and other postconviction filings over two decades; courts curtailed his filings due to serial challenges.
In 2019 Rehaif v. United States held that, to convict under 18 U.S.C. §922(g), the government must prove the defendant knew both that he possessed a firearm and that he had a prohibited status.
Jones could not raise a Rehaif-type claim in a successive §2255 motion because §2255(h) permits successive relief only for certain newly discovered evidence or new constitutional rules made retroactive by the Supreme Court.
Jones filed a §2241 habeas petition invoking §2255’s saving clause (28 U.S.C. §2255(e)), arguing §2255 was inadequate or ineffective to test his detention; the district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding Jones failed to show §2255 was inadequate or ineffective and rejecting his Suspension Clause challenge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §2255’s saving clause (§2255(e)) permits Jones to proceed under §2241 because §2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test his Rehaif claim	Jones: Rehaif created a new legal rule he cannot raise in a successive §2255, so §2255 is inadequate/ineffective	Government: Jones had an opportunity to raise the claim earlier; inadequacy focuses on the remedy itself, not adverse precedent or inability to prevail	Court: Denied — §2255 was not inadequate/ineffective because Jones had an earlier opportunity to present the claim and the defect lies in precedent, not the §2255 remedy
Whether denying §2241 relief here unconstitutionally suspends the writ of habeas corpus	Jones: Blocking his Rehaif claim via §2255’s successive-motion bar effectively suspends habeas as to him	Government: Historical scope of the Suspension Clause and precedent permit the statutory framework; successive-motion bars do not suspend the writ	Court: Denied — historical scope of the writ (as of 1789) would not have afforded Jones habeas relief, and Felker/related precedent reject the suspension argument

Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) (requires government to prove defendant knew prohibited status for §922(g) convictions)
Hill v. Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 2003) (saving clause unavailable where petitioner had opportunity to raise claim earlier)
Lee v. Sanders, 943 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2019) (dismissal for lack of jurisdiction if petitioner fails to show §2255 inadequate)
United States ex rel. Perez v. Warden, FMC Rochester, 286 F.3d 1059 (8th Cir. 2002) (saving clause is a narrowly circumscribed safety valve; problem often existing caselaw, not §2255 remedy)
McCarthan v. Dir., Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (saving clause not available where prior opportunity existed)
Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011) (saving clause not triggered by change in law that could not be raised earlier)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (futility of success on the merits does not excuse failure to raise claim earlier)
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996) (successive-petition restrictions do not automatically create a suspension of the writ)
Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (historical common-law scope of habeas did not extend to challenges to judgments of courts of competent jurisdiction)
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Suspension Clause analysis may begin with the writ as it existed in 1789)