82 F.4th 542
7th Cir.2023Background
- Marcus Conner was convicted of drug offenses after a trial held roughly 1,029 days after charging; he did not obtain a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial objection from trial counsel.
- On direct appeal the speedy-trial claim was deemed forfeited; Conner later raised an ineffective-assistance claim in state postconviction proceedings, which was denied on the merits.
- After the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer, Conner’s postconviction lawyer (Sauer) consulted a habeas practitioner and then told Conner to delay filing a federal habeas petition because counsel planned to file a certiorari petition and believed that would toll the §2244(d)(1) one-year clock.
- That advice was incorrect under Lawrence v. Florida; a certiorari petition filed after state postconviction proceedings do not toll the habeas clock while pending; the one-year period had expired before the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert.
- Conner filed a pro se §2254 petition after the Supreme Court denied cert.; the district court dismissed it as untimely and declined to equitably toll the deadline based on his postconviction counsel’s erroneous advice.
- On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding attorney miscalculation does not constitute the extraordinary, external circumstance required for equitable tolling and therefore did not reach the ineffective-assistance claim’s merits.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the §2244(d)(1) one-year limitations period is subject to equitable tolling because postconviction counsel erroneously advised that a certiorari petition would toll the clock | Conner: Sauer’s mistaken advice was an extraordinary circumstance that prevented timely filing and thus warrants equitable tolling | Reagle: Attorney negligence or miscalculation is not an extraordinary external obstacle; binding precedent forecloses tolling here | No equitable tolling; counsel’s mistake is garden-variety negligence and not an external extraordinary circumstance |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim | Conner: Trial counsel’s failure forfeited/denied his speedy-trial right; ineffective assistance warrants relief | Reagle: Claim was forfeited and/or meritless; in any event, untimeliness bars federal review | Court did not reach merits because petition was untimely; affirmed dismissal on timeliness grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling requires diligence and an extraordinary circumstance; attorney negligence generally insufficient)
- Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (2007) (certiorari filed after state postconviction proceedings does not toll habeas limitations while pending)
- Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009) (certiorari filed at conclusion of direct review tolls habeas clock)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (framework for assessing Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claims)
- United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (pretrial delay prejudice extends beyond impairment of defense)
- Lombardo v. United States, 860 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2017) (attorney mistake in calculating filing deadline is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling)
- Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266 (2012) (acts and omissions of counsel may be charged to the client in certain contexts)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default principles)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (limited exception to procedural default for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (extension of Martinez in certain state-law contexts)
