Marco Davidson v. Kevin R Chappell, 2:12-cv-04862

Davidson challenges his 1996 Santa Barbara County conviction for assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer (35-to-life) and his 1978 robbery conviction, arguing constitutional errors and ineffective assistance related to plea and sentencing.
The petition asserts Apprendi-based sentencing issues, improper use of the 1978 robbery conviction as an aggravating factor, and ineffective assistance in both the 1978 and 1996 cases.
Petitioner appears to have exhausted state remedies earlier in the year, but the petition is facially untimely under AEDPA and may be barred by lack of custody and other defects.
AEDPA imposes a 1-year statute of limitations, generally starting at final judgment, with tolling rules for state post-conviction petitions but not retroactive reopens, and equitable tolling only in rare circumstances.
The petition was filed roughly 15 years after finality, and the court sua sponte raises the timeliness issue under Rule 4 of the habeas rules.
The court orders Petitioner to show cause by a date certain why the action should not be dismissed with prejudice as untimely.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the petition is time-barred under AEDPA §2244(d).	Petitioner asserts tolling or later trigger dates.	Respondent contends no timely trigger or tolling applies.	Petition denied on timeliness grounds; untimely under AEDPA.
Whether equitable tolling or other tolling doctrines save the petition.	Petitioner argues extraordinary circumstance and diligent pursuit.	State argues no substantial basis for tolling given 15-year delay.	Equitable tolling denied; 15 years not justified.
Whether state petitions tolled the federal limitations period.	State petitions should toll the period.	State petitions did not toll under AEDPA; untimely filing persists.	No statutory tolling from state petitions; timely deadline not met.
Whether the petition presents viable habeas claims given custody and procedural posture.	Claims stem from Apprendi, plea agreement, and ineffective assistance.	Claims are foreclosed or procedurally barred by time and law.	Not reached/considered due to dispositive timeliness ruling.
Whether the court should sua sponte dismiss for untimeliness under Rule 4.	N/A	N/A	Court may dismiss sua sponte for timeliness with notice and opportunity to respond.

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003) (AEDPA tolling and untimeliness principles in habeas petitions)
In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770 (Cal. 1998) (state court untimeliness evidences tolling denial; not applicable for federal tolling)
Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643 (9th Cir. 2007) (tolling and untimeliness guidance in state petitions)
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (equitable tolling for extraordinary circumstances; rigorous standard)
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (requirements for equitable tolling in habeas petitions)
Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2001) (tolling and timing considerations for petitions)
Lombardi, Inc. v. Smithfield, 11 A.3d 1180 (Del. 1989) (illustrative example (not used here))
United States v. Gamboa, 608 F.3d 492 (9th Cir. 2010) (AEDPA limitations and related rulings)
Woodall v. Beauchamp, 450 F. App’x 655 (9th Cir. 2011) (cited for custody requirement; not a published official reporter)