Marathon County v. D. K., 937 N.W.2d 901

Background

D.K. was arrested after making delusional claims (phones bugged, being stalked) and allegedly threatening to "strangle" the police chief and "kill" people who mocked him.
Court-ordered emergency detention; two psychiatrists examined D.K.; at the May 11 final hearing the County presented only Dr. Jagdish Dave as a witness (the doctors' reports were filed but not admitted into evidence).
Dr. Dave diagnosed delusional disorder, testified D.K. presented a substantial risk of danger to others, and said D.K. planned to strangle a police officer and kill others; on cross-examination he used more equivocal language (e.g., "could be potentially dangerous").
The circuit court ordered six months’ involuntary commitment and involuntary medication, and issued a firearms ban that the order provided would survive expiration of the commitment.
D.K.’s commitment expired before appeal; the Supreme Court considered (1) whether the challenge was moot and (2) whether the County proved dangerousness under Wis. Stat. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.
The Supreme Court held the appeal was not moot (firearms ban survives expiration) and affirmed the commitment, finding clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (D.K.)	Defendant's Argument (County)	Held
Mootness of challenge to expired commitment	Case is moot because the six-month commitment expired	Not moot (argued below); Court may consider collateral consequences	Not moot — firearms ban surviving the order creates a live collateral consequence
Whether evidence met § 51.20(1)(a)2.b ("substantial probability" via others' "reasonable fear")	Dr. Dave's equivocal cross-exam. statements show only possible risk, not "substantial probability" ("much more likely than not")	Dr. Dave's direct testimony—threats and plan to strangle/kill—establish reasonable fear and substantial probability	Held sufficient: clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness under § 51.20(1)(a)2.b
Meaning of "substantial probability" and "reasonable fear" in § 51.20(1)(a)2.b	N/A (argued insufficiency)	Statutory terms interpreted together; "substantial probability" = "much more likely than not"; "reasonable fear" can support but does not automatically equal substantial probability	Court: "substantial probability" means "much more likely than not"; "reasonable fear" (as evidenced by a recent overt act/attempt/threat) can establish that probability but is a distinct concept
Requirement that medical experts use statutory "magic words" (Melanie L. issue)	Expert must testify to the statutory standard; equivocal phrasing insufficient	Expert need not recite formulaic statutory language; court may apply facts to statute	Court declined a magic-words rule: expert testimony must be linked to statutory standard, but courts make the legal determination; here testimony sufficed when read as a whole

Key Cases Cited

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (U.S. 1979) (clear-and-convincing standard for commitment)
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (U.S. 1975) (state cannot confine nondangerous mentally ill persons)
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. 2008) (recognition of individual right to bear arms)
State v. Curiel, 227 Wis. 2d 389 (Wis. 1999) ("substantial probability" means "much more likely than not")
R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516 (Ct. App. 1988) ("others placed in reasonable fear" need not be subjectively aware of the threat)
Outagamie Cty. v. Melanie L., 349 Wis. 2d 148 (Wis. 2013) (experts must link testimony to statutory standard)
State v. Theoharopoulos, 72 Wis. 2d 327 (Wis. 1976) (collateral consequences can render a challenge not moot)
Waukesha Cty. v. J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d 672 (Wis. 2019) (mootness principles in commitment appeals)
Winnebago Cty. v. Christopher S., 366 Wis. 2d 1 (Wis. 2016) (standard of review for factual findings in commitment cases)
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 271 Wis. 2d 633 (Wis. 2004) (statutory-interpretation principles)