Manveen Saluja Md v. Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP
330367
| Mich. Ct. App. | Mar 16, 2017Background
- Dr. Manveen Saluja (rheumatologist) wrote approximately 285 fentanyl prescriptions (2004–2010) for a patient in India; prescriptions were allegedly filled and transported by a colleague, Dr. Kumar.
- On March 28, 2012, DEA agents arrived at Saluja’s office; Saluja called Honigman attorneys Linda Ross and Angela Sprecher and then signed a DEA voluntary surrender form after an agent urged her to sign.
- DEA later offered reinstatement with scheduling restrictions; negotiations produced a three-year restriction period after counsel changes and communications with DEA headquarters.
- Saluja sued Honigman, Ross, and Sprecher for legal malpractice, claiming they should have advised her she could decline the DEA interview and not sign the surrender form.
- Defendants moved for summary disposition arguing Saluja could not prove causation—i.e., she could not show different advice would have produced a better DEA outcome.
- The trial court granted summary disposition; the Court of Appeals affirmed, finding plaintiff’s causation evidence speculative and insufficient to create a factual dispute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Saluja produced evidence that attorney malpractice proximately caused a worse DEA outcome | Stutsman opined that competent advice (eg, reschedule interview) would likely have preserved Saluja’s full DEA registration | Even with better advice, outcome is speculative; similar result occurred with Dr. Kumar who did not surrender registration | Court: Plaintiff failed to show causation; expert testimony was speculative and inadequate, so summary disposition proper |
| Whether expert testimony offered sufficient basis for causation | Stutsman’s affidavit clarified “good chance” meant more likely than not | Defendants: Stutsman lacked DEA decision-making expertise and conceded uncertainty | Court: Stutsman’s concessions and lack of factual basis render his opinion speculative and insufficient |
| Applicability of Pontiac Sch Dist to malpractice causation | Saluja attempted to distinguish Pontiac as transactional | Defendants relied on Pontiac to show need for direct evidence from decisionmakers | Court: Pontiac applicable—without evidence from DEA decisionmakers, causation is speculation |
| Whether an administrative hearing would likely have preserved registration | Saluja argued an ALJ might have ruled in her favor | Defendants pointed to conduct (prescriptions transported abroad) and DEA investigator statements countering that view | Court: Prognosis that ALJ would side with Saluja is speculative; facts could support revocation/suspension |
Key Cases Cited
- Pontiac Sch Dist v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, 221 Mich. App. 602 (expert speculation insufficient to prove causation)
- Skinner v. Square D Co., 445 Mich. 153 (plaintiff must show causation by more than mere possibility; substantial evidence required)
- Charles Reinhart Co. v. Winiemko, 444 Mich. 579 (liability cannot rest on speculation or conjecture)
- Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co., 451 Mich. 358 (summary disposition burden-shifting; nonmoving party must present documentary evidence creating a factual dispute)
- Bowden v. Gannaway, 310 Mich. App. 499 (elements of legal malpractice claim)
- Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109 (standard of review and summary disposition evidentiary considerations)
- Anzaldua v. Neogen Corp., 292 Mich. App. 626 (standard for granting summary disposition)