Manuela Villa v. Maricopa County
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14148
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 2011–2012 Maricopa County officials intercepted eight calls between Manuela Villa and her daughter on a target phone (Target Line 9) that belonged to neither woman as part of investigation CWT-412.
- Deputy County Attorney Jennifer Brockel signed the wiretap application and attested to reading a supporting affidavit; County Attorney William Montgomery signed a prior authorization delegating certain deputies to apply but did not personally review the affidavit or the evidence.
- The Superior Court issued wiretap orders for multiple target lines; recordings for the 32 target lines in CWT-412 were submitted for sealing on March 1, 2012, more than 30 days after the termination of interception on some lines.
- Villa sued county officials alleging Arizona’s wiretap statute and county practices were preempted by Title III (18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.) and that Title III and the Fourth Amendment were violated; district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on Title III claims (Villa appealed only those rulings).
- The Ninth Circuit held Villa lacked Article III standing to seek prospective declaratory or injunctive relief for herself or a class but had standing to pursue individual damages for past interceptions; the court found two Title III violations but denied damages based on the statutory good-faith defense.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Arizona’s delegation provision (A.R.S. § 13-3010(A)) violates 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) by allowing deputies to apply instead of the principal prosecuting attorney | Villa: § 13-3010(A) permits delegation that undermines Title III’s centralization requirement; Montgomery did not personally approve based on facts | Defendants: State statute permits delegation and county practice (and prior state-court decisions) make delegation lawful and compliant | Held: As applied here, § 13-3010(A) is preempted; applications violated § 2516(2) because Montgomery did not personally indicate familiarity with the facts justifying the wiretaps |
| Whether Arizona’s sealing rule (§ 13-3010(H)) complies with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a) when recordings are submitted at end of entire investigation rather than per-target-line within 10 days | Villa: Federal § 2518(8)(a) requires recordings be submitted promptly after each order’s expiration; waiting until investigation end violates Title III | Defendants: Long-standing Arizona practice was to submit at investigation close; a 10-day per-line rule is not required and state practice was acceptable | Held: § 13-3010(H) as construed to require sealing within 10 days of termination of interception on each target line is not preempted; but the county’s practice of waiting until the investigation’s end violated § 2518(8)(a) in this case |
| Standing to seek prospective injunctive/declaratory relief statewide (individual and class) | Villa: As a state/county taxpayer and a person whose communications were intercepted, she can seek prospective relief | Defendants: No specific heightened risk of future interception; taxpayer status insufficient for Article III prospective relief | Held: Villa lacks Article III standing to seek prospective relief for herself or a class; may only seek damages for past interceptions |
| Availability of damages given violations | Villa: Violations of §§ 2516(2) and 2518(8)(a) entitle her to relief under § 2520 | Defendants: Their actions flowed from state statute and consistent long-standing practice and court orders, so they acted in good faith under § 2520(d) | Held: Title III violations occurred, but defendants are protected by the good-faith defense in § 2520(d); Villa cannot recover damages |
Key Cases Cited
- Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009) (pleading standard and taking complaint allegations as true)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6))
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading requirements)
- Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2011) (standing must be shown for each form of relief)
- Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 1999) (class representative must have standing to pursue class relief)
- Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) (taxpayer standing requires direct injury)
- O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) (requirements for standing to seek prospective relief based on past wrongs)
- City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (must show likelihood of future similar injury for injunctive relief)
- United States v. Smith, 726 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1984) (framework for assessing state wiretap statutes’ compliance with Title III)
- United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1973) (principal-prosecuting-attorney requirement and need for personal judgment)
- United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2009) ("immediately" in sealing context means within one or two days)
- United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257 (1990) (recordings not sealed "immediately" are not per se inadmissible but delay requires explanation)
- United States v. Pedroni, 958 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1992) (sealing timing interpretation)
- United States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2002) (sealing triggered by expiration of intercept order for a particular phone number)