Manuel Campos-Hernandez v. Jefferson Sessions
889 F.3d 564
9th Cir.2018Background
- Manuel Campos-Hernandez, an El Salvador native who entered the U.S. without inspection in 1990–91, admitted removability and has three drug-related convictions (2003, 2005, 2008).
- DHS served a Notice to Appear in 2008; Campos-Hernandez applied for NACARA special-rule cancellation on Feb 10, 2012.
- NACARA §203(b) requires certain inadmissible applicants to show 10 years of continuous physical presence “immediately following the commission of an act, or the assumption of a status, constituting a ground for removal.”
- The IJ denied relief because Campos-Hernandez’s most recent disqualifying conviction (2008) was less than 10 years before his application; the BIA affirmed, relying on Matter of Castro-Lopez, which measures the 10-year period from the most recent ground of removal.
- The Ninth Circuit considered whether to defer to the BIA’s interpretation and whether prior Ninth Circuit authority (Fong) barred such deference.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 10-year NACARA physical-presence period runs from the first disqualifying act/status or the most recent one | Campos-Hernandez: period runs from the first qualifying act/status (earliest) | Government/BIA: period runs from the most recent act/status constituting a ground for removal | Court: the BIA’s interpretation (most recent act/status) is reasonable and entitled to Chevron deference; petition denied |
| Whether the court is bound by Fong v. INS (conflicting earlier authority) | Campos-Hernandez: Fong’s reading controls and precludes the BIA construction | Government: Fong was not an unambiguous holding and thus does not displace agency interpretation under Brand X | Court: Fong left the statute ambiguous; Brand X allows deference to a reasonable agency interpretation |
| Proper standard of deference (Auer v. Chevron) | Campos-Hernandez: agency was interpreting regulation; Auer might apply but regulation mirrors statute | Government: because regulation parrots statute, this is statutory interpretation—Chevron applies | Court: treated it as statutory interpretation and applied Chevron deference to BIA precedent |
| Whether applying BIA rule to Campos-Hernandez renders him eligible for NACARA relief | Campos-Hernandez: he argues eligibility if counting from earliest conviction | Government: he is ineligible because 2008 conviction starts the 10-year clock | Court: Campos-Hernandez is ineligible because his 2008 conviction did not permit a full 10 years of continuous presence; relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.) (discusses NACARA and related regulatory framework)
- Fong v. INS, 308 F.2d 191 (9th Cir.) (earlier construction of identical continuous-presence language favoring petitioner)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (Sup. Ct.) (framework for deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (Sup. Ct.) (when judicial precedent is not unambiguous, an agency interpretation may displace it)
- Ram v. INS, 243 F.3d 510 (9th Cir.) (background on immigration statutory terminology and relief)
- Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir.) (discusses reasonableness standard for agency interpretation)