Mannion v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc.
2016 Ohio 8428
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Laura Mannion, a 55-year-old LPN employed since 1980, was terminated by Lake Hospital System on April 10, 2014 after multiple written performance corrective actions (PCAs) issued by supervisor Marie Creagh.
- Mannion alleges age-based discrimination and wrongful discharge, asserting Creagh made age-related comments and fabricated or overstated PCAs.
- Appellees relied on four PCAs (including medication and attendance issues) as nondiscriminatory grounds for termination.
- Mannion sued in Lake County Court of Common Pleas (filed Oct. 7, 2014); remaining claims at summary judgment were age discrimination and wrongful discharge (intentional infliction of emotional distress was decided below and not appealed).
- The trial court granted summary judgment for defendants, ruling: (1) pre-termination discriminatory acts were time-barred (continuing-violation inapplicable); (2) Mannion failed to make a prima facie wrongful-discharge showing (court focused on replacement-by-substantially-younger-person element not argued by defendants); and (3) no genuine issue of pretext.
- On appeal the Eleventh District: affirmed the ruling on the continuing-violation issue; reversed because the trial court granted summary judgment on an element defendants did not move on; and held there is a genuine factual dispute on pretext such that summary judgment was improper for that ground. Case remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the continuing-violation doctrine tolls R.C. 4112.02(N)’s 180-day filing period for pre-termination acts | Mannion: Creagh’s repeated discriminatory acts constitute a continuing violation that tolls the filing period | Lake Hosp.: Continuing-violation doctrine does not apply; pre-termination discrete acts are time-barred | Court: Continuing-violation inapplicable—no hostile-work-environment claim or evidence of a long‑standing discriminatory policy; pre-termination discrete acts are time-barred |
| Whether Mannion established a prima facie age-discrimination/wrongful-discharge case (trial court sua sponte relied on replacement-by-substantially-younger-person element) | Mannion: She met prima facie elements; trial court erroneously decided an element defendants never challenged | Lake Hosp.: Challenged only the "qualified" element and alternatively offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination | Court: Trial court erred by granting summary judgment on an element defendants did not raise; burden-shifting rules require movant to identify challenged elements |
| Whether defendants’ proffered reason (PCAs/performance) was pretextual | Mannion: Disputes the accuracy/causation of PCAs; points to inconsistent testimony and age-related comments by Creagh as evidence of discriminatory motive | Lake Hosp.: Terminated for legitimate safety/discipline reasons shown by PCAs | Court: Genuine factual disputes exist on credibility/pretext (conflicting testimony and alleged ageist remarks); summary judgment on pretext improper |
| Whether summary judgment for defendants should be affirmed in part | Mannion: N/A (appeals trial court rulings) | Lake Hosp.: N/A | Court: Affirmed on continuing-violation issue; reversed as to wrongful-discharge and pretext determinations; remanded for further proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (establishes the burden-shifting framework for disparate-treatment claims)
- Natl. R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (discrete discriminatory acts are not subject to continuing-violation tolling)
- St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of proving discrimination)
- Kohmescher v. Kroger Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 501 (direct evidence and McDonnell Douglas framework discussed in Ohio context)
- Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112 (movant must specifically delineate grounds for summary judgment)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (moving party’s initial burden and nonmoving party’s reciprocal obligation at summary judgment)