Maloley v. Central Neb. Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 303 Neb. 743

Background

Maloley lived at a leased lot at Johnson Lake (occupied his mother's leased residence) and was notified in 2012 via counsel that he must leave because his conduct disturbed neighbors; he left after negotiating an exit plan.
Central served Maloley a formal August 13, 2013 "ban notice" forbidding entry on Central property in Dawson and Gosper Counties; Maloley nevertheless returned and was arrested multiple times.
Maloley was convicted in two separate county-court cases of second-degree criminal trespass; those convictions have not been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid.
Maloley brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging violations of procedural and substantive due process, First Amendment association, property and equal protection rights related to his exclusion and the ban notice.
Following a bench trial, the district court found for Central (holding Maloley a trespasser, that the 2012 communications provided adequate process, and that Central acted rationally to protect public peace) and dismissed Maloley’s amended complaint with prejudice.
On cross-appeal Central argued the Heck doctrine bars Maloley’s § 1983 claims because success on them would necessarily invalidate his outstanding trespass convictions; the Nebraska Supreme Court agreed and affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred in denying Maloley’s summary judgment and later ruling against him after trial	Maloley argued he was denied constitutional/process rights by the ban and exclusion	Central argued Maloley’s claims are barred because his trespass convictions stand and § 1983 cannot collaterally attack convictions	Denial of summary judgment moot after trial; ultimate ruling for Central affirmed on Heck grounds
Whether Maloley had a protected property/liberty interest giving rise to due process protections	Maloley claimed rights to reside, work, associate, and access public facilities at Johnson Lake	Central argued Maloley waived/forfeited any occupancy interest and, after returning, was a trespasser with no protected interest	Court found Maloley forfeited any leasehold interest and was a trespasser; no protected interest sufficient to overturn convictions
Whether the 2012 communications afforded adequate procedural due process	Maloley contended the ban procedure was defective and deprived him of property without due process	Central argued the 2012 process (notice, negotiated exit, later written ban, opportunity to remove property) satisfied Mathews balancing and public-safety concerns	District court found process adequate; Supreme Court affirmed dismissal based on Heck (process claims, if successful, would imply invalidity of convictions)
Whether § 1983 claims are cognizable while criminal convictions for trespass stand	Maloley argued his suit attacked procedures (ban) not the convictions	Central argued success on the § 1983 claims would necessarily invalidate the trespass convictions, so Heck bars them	Court held Heck bars Maloley’s § 1983 claims because they would call into question the validity of his outstanding trespass convictions

Key Cases Cited

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claim barred unless underlying conviction reversed, expunged, or invalidated when civil success would imply conviction invalidity)
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (framework for balancing private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation, and government interest in procedural due process analysis)
Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (Heck principle applies regardless of relief sought if success would invalidate conviction)
Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005) (§ 1983 action must be dismissed where criminal conviction is fundamentally inconsistent with alleged unlawful behavior)
Cole v. Loock, 259 Neb. 292 (2000) (applying Heck principles to state prisoner § 1983 claims)